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ABSTRACT
Firefighting is an inherently dangerous occupation involving numerous risk sources, unique
contexts, multiple personnel and rapidly changing environments. Firefighting operations are
dynamic in nature yet require calculated risk taking and structured command to prevent the
realisation of potentially catastrophic outcomes to both casualties and rescuers. The notion of
“dynamic risk management” is a term that has gained popularity throughout fire services
worldwide, yet the process of dynamic risk management is typically poorly articulated. This
study demonstrates ‘dynamic risk management’ is a misnomer, with risk management being a
defined process applied within the context of dynamic emergency response. Failure to
recognise this and respond accordingly may leave fire services exposed to adverse findings
should adverse consequences be realised. Further, this study tested the perceptions of risk held
by incident controllers in the Department of Fire and Emergency Services in Western Australia
against AS31000, through a combination of qualitative surveys and subsequent Bayesian
analysis of reported adverse outcomes resulting from all hazards emergency response. This
study found significant variance in risk tolerance between incident controllers and to a lesser
degree, variance in the understanding of risk as defined by AS31000. Bayesian statistical
analysis identified reportable adverse outcomes were almost certain to occur across the
majority of firefighting activities, whilst potential worst case outcomes were rarely historically
realised. The results of this study demonstrate that it is critical for firefighting organisations to
have documented risk thresholds and to provide greater education of risk management in
dynamic situations to incident controllers of all ranks.
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1.0 Introduction

1.1

Background to the Study

Emergency services personnel respond to thousands of dynamic emergency incidents across
Australia each week. As part of this response each incident controller must rapidly and
correctly manage risk within the challenging and dynamic emergency environment. Despite
the intense pressures associated with risk management in these environments, little formal
research has been completed to determine whether current risk management practices are
compliant with International/Australian Standard 31000:2009 – Risk management principles
and guidelines (AS31000).
The primary objective of this study is to determine whether current risk management practices
in dynamic emergency incidents within the Department of Fire and Emergency Services
(DFES) in Western Australia are compliant with AS31000. A subsequent objective is to define
the internal context of dynamic risk management within the operational incident management
and response section of DFES.
In order to evaluate current practices within DFES, first a systematic review of internal and
external literature is presented. Next, the results of qualitative semi-structured interviews of
participating incident controllers are analysed and compared with organisational literature and
policies to determine current practices and define to the internal risk context applicable to the
study group. Finally, Bayesian statistical analysis of historical incident occurrence data is
discussed to further define the internal risk context and to facilitate improved practice.
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1.2

Significance of the Study

This study is significant in that it is the first of its kind in Western Australia and potentially
nationwide. Results may not only serve to enhance risk management in dynamic emergency
environments, but to also reduce the incidence of injury to responders through the
harmonisation and documentation of risk tolerance and acceptable practice.

1.3

Research Question

Is risk management in dynamic emergency operations in the Western Australian fire and
emergency service compliant with AS31000?

1.4

Hypotheses

Null Hypothesis (H0)
Risk management during dynamic emergency operations in the Western Australian fire
and emergency service is compliant with AS31000.
Alternate Hypothesis (H1)
Risk management during dynamic emergency operations in the Western Australian fire
and emergency service is not compliant with AS31000.
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2.0 The Literature

2.1

The Standard of Risk Management

Australian and international standards are collaboratively developed by subject matter experts,
industry and other invested stakeholders in order to provide benchmarks for construction or
processes. When referenced by relevant local legislation these standards become mandatory,
without such reference the standards serve the same purpose albeit only when adopted
voluntarily by organisations. One such standard is AS31000 which provides the architecture
for the management of risk regardless of circumstance or consequence.

Failure by

organisations or individuals to manage risk in accordance with AS31000 does not necessarily
equate to adverse outcomes. However, criticism and adverse finding may occur where
AS31000 is not followed and an adverse outcome eventuates, especially where consequences
are severe and may have been avoided. In occupations involving rapidly changing and multiple
risk sources, multiple personnel and the potential for the loss of life there is little margin for
error in managing risk and consequently, compliance with AS31000 becomes vital. This
chapter examines risk in the context of firefighting operations.
2.2

Defining Risk

Risk and the process of risk management applicable to all situations are defined in detail within
AS31000; SAHB 436:2013 Risk management guidelines – Companion to AS/NZS ISO
31000:2009 (SAHB 436); and SAHB 89:2013 Risk management – Guidelines on risk
assessment techniques (SAHB 89). Whilst the term ‘risk’ is often incorrectly used concurrently
with or instead of the term ‘hazard’, risk is specifically defined as the “effect of uncertainty on
objectives” (AS31000 s2.1). Risk is not an event (SAHB 436, s2.1). It is not an explosion,
pg. 3

fire or other emergency. Risk cannot be expressed as either positive or negative, but rather as
the likelihood of a consequence, positive or negative, occurring. When applied to emergency
response it is essential to appreciate that incidents are dynamic, occurring within an
environment subject to constant change and therefore the level of uncertainty and therefore
risk, must be constantly reassessed.

Risk is often inappropriately described (SAHB 436). To appropriately describe risk three
elements must be specified:
1. The objective(s) being referred to;
2. The particular source of uncertainty; and
3. How the source of uncertainty may lead to consequences.

In the emergency response setting an example of a statement of risk may include:
There is the potential that firefighters will have to rescue casualties involved in a high
speed vehicle crash, which in turn will cause injury or harm to the firefighters from mechanical,
thermal and chemical hazards preventing all firefighters completing the rescue unharmed.

In this statement:
1. The objective is firefighters completing the rescue do so unharmed;
2. The source of uncertainty (risk source) is the vehicle rescue; and
3. Exposure to mechanical, thermal and chemical hazards may lead to the
consequences, i.e., firefighters getting injured.
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From this example it becomes clear that during dynamic emergency incidents firefighters must
be acutely aware of the objectives to be met in the first instance. This requires comprehensive
guidance at an organisational level to establish objectives well before an incident occurs.
Although specific standing objectives may vary between fire services, the general objectives
of the preservation of life, property and the environment are common between services. These
general objectives are typically not further defined. Nor are overarching statements of risk
evident in any of the Australian or international fire brigade literature that satisfies the criteria
of SAHB 436.

2.3

Risk Management and Managing Risk in Dynamic Situations

‘Risk management’ refers to the structure (principles, framework and process) for managing
risk effectively whilst ‘managing risk’ refers to the application of that structure to the decision
making process (SAHB 436, s2.9). Whilst DFES Directive 0.0 “The Fundamentals of DFES
Operations” (date unknown) provides some guidance in relation to time poor decision making
during emergency management and utilises the word “risk”, it provides no discussion or
commentary as to the organisational definition of risk or risk management process. The risk
management process detailed in AS31000 (Figure 1) provides the architecture for decision
making involving risk and must be applied in every situation, including emergency response,
for risk to be deemed to have been considered sufficiently (SAHB 436, p44).
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Figure 1: AS31000 Risk management process (AS31000, figure 1)

SAHB 436 (s5.1.2) identifies the process of risk management and must be fully applied in
every situation regardless of the complexity of the issues faced, the dynamic nature of the
operating environment and the time available to make required decisions. Further, SAHB 436
(p45) provides the following example which may be interpreted as being directly applied to the
firefighting context:
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“A military special forces section leader might have a split second in which to make a
tactical decision on which personal wellbeing and that of subordinates as well as the
success of the mission, might depend. In that time the leader must recall the objectives,
appreciate the external and internal environment, assess the risks, consider the options,
review those against the objectives and take the appropriate action. Despite the very short
decision making window, the quality of each of these steps must be of the highest
standard.”

Failure to sufficiently understand risk or to apply the entire risk management structure to
dynamic decision making in the emergency environment can result in decisions that exacerbate
rather than mitigate adverse consequences. Should adverse outcomes eventuate it may also
lead to post incident scrutiny of the decisions made by incident controllers. Existing studies
suggest risk assessment in accordance with AS31000 may not occur during frontline
emergency response (Ash & Smallman, 2008; Sadler, Holgate & Clancy, 2007).

The term ‘context’ applies to both the risk management framework (architecture) as well as the
process of risk management. In terms of architecture, the context includes both the external
and internal environment in which the organisation or individual operates (SAHB 436, s2.8).
In order to establish context effectively, it is necessary to clearly define both the objectives to
be achieved and the parameters to be considered whilst managing risk. Failure to clearly
establish the context may lead to the entire risk management architecture and process being
flawed as a consistent approach cannot be achieved. The stages of establishing the context are
illustrated in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: HB 436 Establishing the context.

DFES (2013c) identified four primary objectives of the organisation as the preservation of life,
property, critical infrastructure and the environment (in that order). These objectives were
found to be identical to those of other departments in both Australia and internationally (NZFS;
2008, QFRS, 2008). Further, DFES (2015d) identified the following objectives applied to
certain operational incidents in the order they are listed:
1. Rescue (effect rescue of human life);
2. Exposures (prevent adjacent assets including houses and infrastructure becoming
impacted by fire);
3. Containment (contain the fire to the smallest area or structure possible);
4. Extinguishment (extinguish the fire);
pg. 8

5. Overhaul (ensure the hazard is eliminated);
6. Ventilate (removing smoke);
7. Environment (protect the environment from the hazard and firefighting activities); and
8. Salvage (prevent avoidable damage).

Whilst no literature specific to the risk attitudes of firefighters in the Western Australian fire
service exists, Fender’s (2003) American study identified the following objectives were
common amongst career and volunteer firefighters:


Not to let fellow firefighter’s down; and



Live up to community expectations.

These objectives appear to support the high personal risk threshold observed in firefighters as
reported by Penney (2013) and Moore-Merrill et al. (2008) and discussed further in section 4
of this report.

The external environment includes regulatory or legislative requirements to be adhered to as
well as community and political attitudes that directly influence the internal environment. The
external environment provides overall strategic parameters within which operations must
remain to be deemed publicly acceptable and to be deemed lawful. This helps define the
architecture that governs the interpretation and application of the risk management process.
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The internal environment includes organisational attitudes, the beliefs of the individual risk
manager, and the specific purpose and setting for the particular application of the risk
management process at a specific time and place. Where organisational risk attitudes are not
defined or communicated the individual risk manager inherently relies upon their own risk
thresholds.

Regardless of the nature or location of an emergency, firefighting remains an occupation and
thereby subject to the same laws as any other workplace (Occupational Safety and Health Act,
1984 - OSH Act). Section 19 of the OSH Act details the requirements of employers to provide
a safe work environment ‘so far as is practicable.’ Whilst certain exemptions are made for
dangerous Police work under Section 4A of the OSH Act, no such exemptions exist for
firefighters at fire, rescue or other related emergency incidents. During firefighting operations
it may be considered that the employer is actually the fire brigade Commissioner or other senior
ranking officer who is unlikely to be physically present at the scene of an emergency incident.
This does not exempt the employer from providing a safe workplace including safe systems of
work and information, instruction and training (COSH, 2005). Employees at the incident, in
particular those in positions of command or control, also have responsibilities under Section
20 of the OSH Act. These responsibilities include taking:
“take all reasonable care –
a) To ensure his or her own safety and health at work; and
b) To avoid adversely affecting the safety or health of any other person through act
or omission at work.”
OSH Act s20
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In considering whether an employee has met their duties under the OSH Act, courts consider
how a ‘reasonable person’ may have acted in that particular case. COSH (2005, p8) identifies
that a value judgement “is made on the values of the society of the day” and the more a person
is aware of associated risk, the greater their obligation to manage that risk.

Fire brigade literature (DFES, 2013c) identifies that usual duties of operational officers involve
performing risk assessments, safeguarding firefighters from harm and controlling operations at
emergency incidents. In Western Australia, the Department of Fire and Emergency Services
(2013b) identifies Fire and Rescue Service firefighters as responsible for emergency response
to:


road crash rescue;



structure fire;



bushfire;



chemical and hazardous material management including gas leaks; and



flood, storm or tempest.

The literature indicates that firefighters and officers are professionals responsible for the
response and management of a wide range of dangerous emergency incidents. In consideration
of the relevant legislation, firefighters and officers may be held to a higher obligation to provide
a safe workplace during dynamic and dangerous situations. In order to achieve this as part of
their normal work role they are provided with enhanced training and specialist equipment.

In addition to the defined work role and specific focus on risk management during emergency
response in dynamic situations, firefighters are also held in special regard by the community.
pg. 11

In the absence of formal research, popular commercial literature was reviewed to determine
community opinion towards the firefighting profession. A decade of national popular opinion
polls (Flynn, 2014) identifies firefighters as being the second most trusted profession by the
Australian community (the first being paramedics). Whilst far from formal research, these
public opinion polls demonstrate firefighters are held in high regard by the people they serve.
The gravity of this external regard also serves to develop the internal context for firefighters
on the ground in the form of pressure to make difficult decisions in order to live up to
community expectations.

The internal context as applied to firefighting may be divided into two distinct levels. The first
being the organisational attitudes, policies and operational frameworks that provide the
structure for the fire service. The second being the internal culture of the firefighting stations
and crews themselves.

Organisational culture is indoctrinated into firefighters from the first day they commence as
trainees. Discipline, obedience, calculated risk taking and teamwork are part of the founding
traits imbedded into probationary firefighters by their instructors. Development of these traits
is supported by an overarching organisational attitude reflected in the manner training is
administered, conducted and resourced. Whilst an abundance of Australian fire service tactical
training literature was located, a striking absence of Australian fire service risk ideology was
identified.
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other than that comprehensively detailed by the UK Fire Service (see section 2.4 of this report)
was noted. Internationally, the “Safe Person Concept” was identified in various forms (IFAC,
2012, NFPA, 2013; NZFS, 2008) which partially defines risk attitudes amongst fire services.
Summarised, the New Zealand fire service interpretation of the Safe Person Concept (NZFS,
2008) is:
“We may risk our safety, in a highly calculated manner, to protect saveable lives.
We may risk our safety a little, in a very careful manner, to protect saveable property.
We will not risk our safety for lives or property that are obviously lost.”

Whilst these three sentences clearly articulate the risk attitudes and thresholds of the New
Zealand Fire Service’s, further definition of the term “calculated” is not provided. The absence
of this definition suggests that a subjective and qualitative assessment may be considered
acceptable by the fire service hierarchy in identified scenarios. Whilst senior fire service
hierarchy are unlikely to be present at an operational incident in all but the most extreme cases,
the culture they create is carried within each operational person onto the incident ground and
may be considered to have a significant impact on the way an incident controller manages risk.

Perhaps the more intimate internal firefighter culture that affects risk management during
emergency operations is the culture amongst firefighting crews.

Firefighters spend a

significant amount of time together during both emergency incidents and routine station life
(Childs, Morris & Ingram, 2004). In this environment indoctrinated traits established by
organisational culture invariably flourish and form a unique environment that has the capacity
to directly influence an incident controller’s management of risk during dynamic emergency
operations.
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Firefighters have long been seen as “heroic, blue collar battlers” (Childs, Morris & Ingham,
2004) where time honoured practices, as opposed to formal research and evidence based
practice, have formed the basis for both strategic and tactical response by firefighters at the
‘coal face.’ This reliance on traditional approaches and professional craft knowledge passed
down through firefighter generations is viewed with pride amongst many firefighters (Penney,
2013) and serves to build a strong culture and internal context of self-reliance and belief.

Reports released by the National Interagency Fire Centre (1996) and Moore-Merrell et al.
(2008) identify an established culture of risk taking amongst firefighters in order ‘to get the
job done’ regardless of operational guidelines.

This is supported by the findings of

Kunadharaju, Smith and Dejoy (2011) who reported (in contrast to most high hazard work)
firefighting operations are actively based on hazard engagement, typically compounded by
acute time pressures. However, Prochniak (2014), found firefighters are acutely aware of the
fragility of time and life. Further, Prochniak (2014, p257) found that “firefighters wishing to
pursue a dangerous occupational task must plan their own behaviour, concentrate on the goal,
and maintain a temporal distance from the task by focusing on a lack of time pressure.”

Fender (2003) identified multiple firefighter specific traits that directly affected their risk
tolerance. These included:


The age of a victim - the younger the victim the higher the threshold to personal
injury or death;



Respect for the officer in charge – firefighters were willing to undertake more
dangerous tasks if they respected the officer giving a command;



A sense of pride in taking risks; and



Expectations of the community.
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A previous study into the decontamination practices of firefighters exposed to hazardous and
toxic materials (Penney, 2013) also found a tendency amongst firefighters to perceive
hazardous incidents as routine if they were encountered and completed without acute health
effects becoming evident.

As identified in the literature discussed in this section, firefighting is a unique profession that
attracts a certain type of person with a natural tolerance to personal risk. These personnel are
then placed in dynamic and dangerous situations whilst surrounded by a culture of risky
behaviour, arguably as a result of occupational necessity. This environment is potentially
further fuelled by the weight of perceived public expectation and human distress in traumatic
circumstances. Whilst this internal context may actually enhance the capacity of firefighters
to complete the job required, it may also lead to behaviour that may be deemed to be
inappropriate in accordance with the external context, especially when adverse outcomes
eventuate.

With the possible exception of community attitude, the external context applicable to the
firefighting environment is the same as that applied to other workplaces. As an employer, fire
services are required to provide a safe workplace and supervisors have a legal duty of care to
employees under their management. Further, as fire services personnel are expected to work
in critical, hazardous and dynamic environments (DFES, 2012a, 2012b, 2013b, 2015a, 2015b,
2015d) it may be argued that fire service incident controllers have a greater duty of care to their
crews than would be expected of other community members in that same situation. The
increased accountability of the external context must be compared to the effects of the internal
context which supports risk taking behaviour with limited formal quantified guidance.
pg. 15

Whilst it is acknowledged that the dynamic emergency environment requires a significant
amount of flexibility for incident controllers, the absence of formal guidance in the literature
reviewed suggests a gap between external statutory requirements and internal expectations
within fire services. Awareness of the differences between external and internal contexts and
how each may affect an incident controller’s perceptions and firefighter actions on the incident
ground would likely only enhance the ability of an incident controller to better appreciate an
emergency situation and enhance the management of associated risk. This has the subsequent
potential benefit of reducing firefighter injuries and fatalities as a consequence of occupational
events.

Risk identification is “the process of finding, recognizing and describing risks” (SAHB 89,
s3.3). Whilst traditional risk identification may involve data analysis, modelling, testing and
research, the dynamic and often critical nature of emergency response requires the process of
risk identification to be undertaken in an instantaneous yet accurate manner. As Kunadharaju,
Smith and Dejoy (2011) identify, “there is little protective redundancy in firefighting” and
emergency situations often change with little or no forewarning.

The dynamic nature of emergency incidents also requires risk identification to be undertaken
frequently; with each risk identification and subsequent analysis occurring as a single event at
a point in time as opposed to being an ongoing sustained practice throughout the duration of
an incident. It may therefore be argued that the term “dynamic” in dynamic risk assessment
must only refer to the constantly changing emergency event as opposed to an ongoing yet
changing structure of risk management.
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SAHB 89 identifies that the process of risk identification may take the form of structured
techniques which involve the use of foresight in conjunction with existing knowledge to
develop a series of ‘what if’ questions. The ‘what if’ questions within the literature reviewed
were inherently dependent on the incident controller’s own personal knowledge and experience
as opposed to quantified data or formal evidence based practice (DFES, 2013c, 2015c).

Risk analysis (also known as risk assessment) is the “process to comprehend the nature of risk
and to determine the level of risk” (SAHB 89, s3.4). The process of comprehension requires
the risk manager to be able to adequately interpret risk sources in a structured manner and to
subsequently understand the probability and consequences of an event occurring. During even
the most rapidly changing emergency situations the risk management framework and structure
remains the same. Each risk analysis must be considered a new separate analysis, even if it
builds upon a previously and recently completed analysis of the same emergency situation at
an earlier point in time.

This realisation is significant because it supports the theory that dynamic risk management
does not involve a changing architecture or process of analysis, but rather the same risk
management architecture and analysis process applied multiple times during a rapidly changing
(dynamic) emergency situation. The risk analysis undertaken during an emergency may
therefore comply with AS31000, even if it is required to be supported by extensive pre-incident
analysis and preparation.
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Risk analysis may either be qualitative, quantitative or a combination of both. However,
quantitative analysis requires the analysis of numerical data to determine probability. Risk can
then be described as a numerical value by multiplying the sum of incident exposures, statistical
probability and consequence weight (Xin & Huang, 2013). Quantitative Risk analysis of this
nature requires extensive data and time, therefore it cannot be undertaken within the parameters
and constraints of a single emergency incident. This is highlighted in the Australian Capital
Territory Emergency Services Authority (date unknown) Dynamic Risk assessment overview
statement that “often, rescues have to be performed, exposures protected and hose lines placed
before a complete appreciation of all material facts have been obtained” (p2).

Qualitative analysis involves descriptive and often subjective appraisal of risk as described by
the assessor. It is often useful when risk treatment strategies involve multiple risks at different
levels that cannot be accurately measured on the same quantitative scale (SAHB 89). It is an
approach that is identified as being employed during preliminary or scoping assessments. For
example, SAHB 89 states that “in cases where the analysis is qualitative, there should be a
clear explanation of all the terms employed and the basis for all criteria should be recorded”
(p18). Review of fire services literature (ACTEMS, unknown; DFES, 2013a; NZFS, 2018;
SACFS, 2014) identified that whilst prioritised objectives of the protection of life, property and
the environment were common across jurisdictions, explanations of terminology were largely
absent from operational material. Whilst some explanation of qualitative risk was found
(DFES, 2013d, 2014) these explanations were found in corporate policies rather than in
operational doctrine or procedure.
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Quantitative risk analysis relies on the numerical representation and calculation of event
probabilities, frequencies and distributions. Considered the epitome of fire risk analysis in the
International Fire Engineering Guidelines (ABCB, 2005), probabilistic risk analysis requires
detailed and time consuming consideration of all possible outcomes as either a function of
incidence, Bayesean probability or life/dollar loss per unit time (Yung, 2008). Such analysis
requires availability of substantial high quality data as well as the ability to numerically
represent variability within defined confidence levels. Whilst typical quantitative analysis,
including fault tree or event tree diagrams, may be particularly useful for pre-incident planning
and as a supporting assurance process, their complexity and time required for completion
render them impractical for incident ground completion.

Review of available literature

identified that whilst significant international statistical analysis of fire related fatality and
injury data were available (DCLG, 2012; FEMA, 2009, 2011) a total absence of statistical
analysis of Australian firefighting injuries and risk management during dynamic operations
was noted in both published and internal brigade documentation.

Analysis of implemented controls may be considered to have both qualitative and quantitative
components (SAHB 89, SAHB 436). For example, reviews of historical injury data may
provide quantitative probabilities pertaining to the effectiveness of certain personal protective
equipment in reducing firefighter injuries, whilst fire ground experience may provide an
incident controller with valuable insight into the effectiveness of specific tactics in certain
situations.

Yung (2008) asserts that reliance on qualitative assessment alone must be

considered fundamentally flawed because subjective judgements cannot be verified and may
often differ between operators. Further, the same operator may make different decisions given
the same situation at various points in time. The use of a mixed approach may provide the
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benefits of pre-incident quantitative data analysis supporting the rapid qualitative analysis
conducted by incident controllers in dynamic emergency situations. This type of approach can
be represented by a Bow-Tie analysis (SAHB 436) allowing the predetermined risk sources
and prioritised event causes to be the focus of qualitative assessment during dynamic
emergency situations (see figure 5, p72).

Decisions made on the incident ground have previously been found to be reactionary rather
than considered (Ash & Smallman, 2008; Sadler, Holgate & Clancy, 2007) or to be adapted
from previous experience at similar situations or incidents potentially without thorough
analysis (Tissington, 2004). Jacobs (2010) as well as Loflin and Kipp (1997) suggest dynamic
risk management in the emergency rescue context is often restricted to a qualitative selection
of tactics guided by tacit professional craft knowledge as opposed to quantified risk assessment
and evidence based practice as part of the entire risk management process. In order to achieve
consistency with AS31000, it is suggested incident ground decisions must be made using a
combination of quantified historical statistical analysis and qualitative personal judgement by
the incident controller.

Evaluation of risk may only be correctly undertaken if there are clear criteria (context and risk
threshold) against which the evaluation occurs. As previously identified, clear and concise risk
criterion specific to dynamic emergency situations are not prevalent throughout fire services.
Consequently, incident ground controllers may be considered to be largely self-reliant on their
own decision making processes and internal judgement.
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Klein’s Recognition-Primed Decision (1989) and Rasmussen’s Decision Ladder (1976, cited
in Naikar, 2010) represent two accepted models representing the decision process of
experienced personnel in dynamic situations. Both models are dependent on a high level of
expertise from the decision maker and the ability to process information in a structured
sequence that characterises rational, knowledge-based behaviour (Naikar, 2010). Neither
model references the application of risk management into the decision making process or how
prior exposure may influence risk tolerance and the cognitive process. This suggests that unless
risk management forms part of the inherent expertise of the practitioner it will not be
considered. Further, inappropriate or insufficient understanding and consideration of risk may
leave emergency services personnel with potentially dangerous familiarity with the hazards
they face (Sadler, Holgate & Clancy, 2007).

Differences in the identification of objectives and the willingness to accept and retain risk (risk
tolerance) between strategic and tactical levels within an emergency services organisation, as
reported by Ash and Smallman (2008) and Jacobs (2010), may result in risk management
decisions being made by incident controllers that could be later considered to be inappropriate
or unjustified. Further, Ash and Smallman (2010) identified the perception by emergency
services personnel that strategic (organisational) decisions and guidance may hinder
achievement of goals at a tactical level and actually contribute to inappropriate risk
management during emergency response.

Risk treatment involves the application of mitigating processes, systems or other inhibitors to
reduce the likelihood or consequence of an event occurring (AS31000, SAHB 89, SAHB 436).
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Consequences of inaccurate identification of risk and subsequent analysis and treatment can be
catastrophic with Moore-Merill et al (cited in Ash and Smallman, 2010) identifying 19% of all
firefighter deaths in the United States between 2000 and 2005 being a direct result of human
error. In the context of firefighting operations, risk treatments (also known as controls) may
be considered in the contextualisation of the traditional hierarchy of controls.

The hierarchy of controls relates to the application of risk barriers or treatments that either
reduce the likelihood of an event occurring or reduce the severity of a consequence (Robinson
et al., 2010. The higher the order of the treatment, the more it is deemed to be effective. A
contextualised hierarchy of controls is illustrated in Figure 3. At the top of the hierarchy is
“elimination” which refers to the removal of the risk source. In the firefighting context this
may be viewed as pre-operational actions such as arson prevention or road safety campaigns.
During an emergency incident “elimination” may include the decision not to commit crews,
but rather to isolate a fuel source and permit it to ‘burn out’ so that lives are not endangered.

Elimination
Substitution
Engineering
Administration
Personnel Attitudes
PPE

Figure 3: Contextualised Hierarchy of Controls
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Next in the hierarchy is “substitution” which is difficult to translate to the firefighting context
because firefighters often respond to emergency situations where time and resourcing
restrictions are encountered. It may be considered that a decision to use defensive firefighting
strategies, as opposed to offensive internal firefighting strategies, may meet the definition for
substitution because even though the risk source is not eliminated, the approach to resolving
the incident is specifically varied in a manner that reduces the potential for an adverse event to
occur.

“Engineering” controls are those that isolate assets from the risk source. In the firefighting
context this may only be partially achieved because there is likely to be a requirement for at
least several firefighters to be present within the ‘hot’ zone (DFES, 2012b, 2015b, 2015d) and
this remains essential to resolving many dynamic emergency situations. Isolation occurs
through the implementation of controlled access to areas within an emergency incident that are
the greatest risk source through Entry Control Officers and physical demarcation (DFES,
2015a, 2015b). Despite the use of isolation controls at emergency incidents, which may reduce
the potential for greater numbers of adverse outcomes, incident controllers are still required to
commit sufficient firefighters into hazardous situations in order to resolve the emergency.

“Administrative” controls are the policies, procedures and ‘doctrine’ that provide
organisational guidance as to the appropriate manner in which to resolve a dynamic emergency
situation. Extensive fire services literature in this area was found (DFES, 2013a, 2013d),
however, an absence of established risk criterion or documented risk thresholds was also noted.
No reason for this absence was found.
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“Personnel attitudes” are an addition to the traditional hierarchy of controls and may be
considered a critical component to the contextualised hierarchy of controls within the
firefighting environment. It may be considered that personnel attitudes are significantly
influenced by the internal context in which they evolve (Lloyd, 2005, Lloyd, 2008) and the
internal context of firefighters is particularly influential. Without specific guidance and
ongoing detailed training, personnel may be encouraged (or even forced) to behave in a
particular way “not because they believe in that form of behaviour but it is seen as the way out
of a predicament” (Hutchinson, 2010, p15). It is therefore surmised that the attitude of
individual firefighters under the command of an incident controller must be considered in the
contextualised hierarchy of controls. Whilst good attitudes will afford some benefit for the
reduction of the likelihood of an adverse outcome, poor attitudes will inevitably increase the
potential for failure to implement or abide by other controls and therefore increase both the
probability and severity of adverse outcomes on the incident ground.

“Personal protective equipment” colloquially known as PPE within fire services represents the
final line of defence between personnel and an adverse outcome. Whilst some PPE may in fact
reduce the potential for realisation of an adverse effect, for instance breathing apparatus
theoretically preventing a firefighter inhaling toxic smoke and products of combustion (DFES,
2015a, 2015b), it must also be considered that the presence of PPE may result in firefighters
undertaking greater risk taking behaviour due to a perception that the PPE affords them
complete or excessive levels of protection (Penney, 2013).
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By definition, dynamic emergency situations constantly change. Regardless of whether an
incident involves a leaking hazardous material, multi storey apartment fire or a heavy vehicle
crash, the number and level of hazards will change as the incident evolves (DFES, 2012a,
2012b, 2013a, 2013b, 2015a). Monitoring, review and communication may be considered to
occur on two distinct levels appropriate to the internal and external context.

Within the internal environment of a dynamic emergency incident the incident controller must
constantly reapply the risk management architecture within the operational constraints they
face. This cyclical process is illustrated by Bailey (2007) in Figure 4 and represents the current
approach adopted by Australian fire services to dynamic risk management as supported in the
literature reviewed. As previously discussed, the available time with which to make decisions
and subsequently communicate these decisions to all persons on the incident ground is likely
to be limited, whilst the potential consequences of an incorrect decision may be catastrophic.
The monitoring and review process may also be limited to a single decision maker or the
Incident Management Team depending on the severity and longevity of an incident (DFES,
2013a, 2013c, 2015c). Whilst the Incident Management Team has the luxury of discussion,
multiple experiences and qualifications to draw from, the sole incident controller is only
resourced by their own knowledge and experiences. This realisation supports the notion that
pre-event risk analysis may be critical to supporting correct decisions during dynamic
emergency incidents.

pg. 25

Figure 4: Fireground decision making cycle (Bailey, 2007, p4).

External to the immediate dynamic emergency event, post incident reviews, Worksafe
investigations and even criminal prosecutions may occur. These external reviews will occur
weeks if not many months after an incident has finished with findings potentially handed down
by persons external to the fire service culture. Therefore, critical assessment of the decisions
made, particularly if catastrophic outcomes are realised, will not be made against internal fire
services procedures or doctrine but rather against the standards and duty of care required by
the greater community.

In considering the impacts of both internal and external reviews of risk management during
dynamic emergency operations, it is concluded that it is vital for decisions made within the
internal firefighting context (during an active dynamic emergency environment) to meet the
standards expected by the external community. Failure to achieve this may result in additional
consequences unforeseen during the emergency.
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2.4

United Kingdom Incident Risk Management

The risk management methodology for dynamic emergency incidents adopted by United
Kingdom Fire Services as published by the Department for Communities and Local
Government (DCLG) is comprehensive and requires specific attention in this report. The first
of these publications is the Fire and Rescue Authorities “Health, safety and welfare framework
for the operational environment” (DCLG, 2013) which details a comprehensive architecture
for management of dynamic incident risk that commences with the brigade’s senior officers
and ends with the individual emergency responder on the incident ground. This publication is
unique amongst the literature reviewed in that it not only acknowledges Health and Safety
legislation, often viewed as encumbrance to emergency response, but embraces it as a pillar of
dynamic emergency risk management.

In doing so the United Kingdom Fire Services succinctly define both internal and external
organisational risk contexts as they apply to frontline operations allowing incident controllers.
Further, DCLG (2013) not only articulates the dynamic incident risk assessment process
through the hierarchy of command but provides multiple fire service specific examples for
incident controllers and front line personnel of all ranks and operational roles to reference.
Perhaps most importantly from an organisational context is the recognition that “standard
operational procedures need to be sufficiently flexible to allow the Incident Commander to
exercise discretion on the resources and the procedures required to resolve the emergency”
(DCLG, 2013, p23). The flexibility for incident controllers and personnel to use ‘operational
discretion’ is carefully articulated and “should be based on a balance in terms of risk versus
benefit, and the Incident Commander knowing the action which they are normally required by
the relevant standard operational procedure” (DCLG, 2013, p23).
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The second publication is the Fire and Rescue Manual 2nd Volume “Fire Service Operations –
Incident Command” (DCLG, 2008). It is the doctrine of fire service dynamic incident
management at all levels and embraces incident risk management as one of the three key
elements required for effective incident command. Most significantly DCLG (2008, p64)
recognises “in order to provide an acceptable level of protection at operational incidents, the
organisations health and safety management must operate at three different levels – Strategic,
Systematic and Dynamic.” At a strategic level, risk management defines the fire service’s risk
attitudes and establishes internal context whilst complying with relevant external contexts.
This is achieved through appropriate policy and doctrine that embrace the risk philosophy of
the fire service. Systematic risk management is completed by the operational subject matter
experts in each discipline. The results subsequently guide the development and implementation
of operations including but not limited to safe work systems, procedures, equipment, training
and supervision.

Dynamic risk management occurs during an operational incident and

encompasses all risk management carried out by all personnel involved in the incident whilst
an emergency situation is present.

In considering the application of ‘dynamic risk management’ it is essential to distinguish
between time critical emergency situations, for instance where lives are endangered and rescue
is required, and non-emergency situations such as body recovery. The distinction is critical as
risk thresholds will vary accordingly as demonstrated in the New Zealand “Safe Person
Concept” (NZFS, 2008) and the philosophy of the DCLG (2008, p65)
“In a highly calculated way, firefighters:


Will take some risk to save saveable lives.



May take some risk to save saveable property.
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Will not take any risk at all to try and save lives or property that are already
lost.”

Whilst New Zealand literature considers dynamic incident risk management in isolation, the
United Kingdom acknowledges it as only a part of the greater risk management process
applicable to the fire service as a workplace and subsequently ensures transference of the
internal and external risk contexts into the dynamic incident risk management process. This
holistic approach adopted by DCLG (2008, 2013) enables Incident Controllers to manage risk
in accordance with AS31000 regardless of the nature of the emergency encountered.

2.5

Discussion

Fire services have a strong culture and tradition that culminates in a unique internal risk
management environment. Firefighters have been found to hold common attitudes towards
personal risk tolerance and an occupation that places them directly in stressful emergency
situations that may promote risk taking behaviour. This is compounded by a perception of
community expectation that firefighters will put their own lives in peril for others in life or
death situations. Therefore, the requirement for accurate and timely risk assessment and
management in dynamic situations becomes critical.

Australian and international fire service literature extensively details the strategic and tactical
approaches for a significant variety of dynamic emergency incidents. Significant studies
examining the decision making process of incident ground incident controllers were also found.
With the exception of DCLG (2008, 2013) the reviewed literature provides somewhat more
limited guidance as to the management of risk in dynamic emergency situations. Even more
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limited is an analysis of the specific compliance of this guidance with the standards of the
external environment and potential external review.

The absence of formal guidance from Australian fire services towards AS31000 compliant risk
management is not perceived as a deliberate measure, but rather as the result of an evolution
of risk management in business driving standards and litigation at a faster rate than within the
unique and largely traditional firefighting environment. It is not suggested that quantitative
risk analysis can be undertaken within the dynamic emergency context. However, completion
of quantitative risk analysis prior to an event and its use to support risk management practices
during dynamic emergency incidents is however, viewed as being critical for the alignment of
internal and external expectations and risk management standards.

The philosophies and processes articulated in DCLG (2008, 2013) are the gold standard of
dynamic incident risk management. Results of the data obtained and discussed in the next
section of this thesis are designed to enable the contextualisation of these documents within the
Department of Fire and Emergency Services and to facilitate bridging the risk management
knowledge gap identified in Australia.
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3.0 Study Methodology

3.1

Overview

The study utilised both qualitative and quantitative research methodologies. Data was collected
in two distinct phases. The first involved qualitative observational ethnology, the second
involved collection of historical incident and safety reports. Ethics approval was obtained
through the Human Ethics Committee, Edith Cowan University whilst formal approval of the
research was also provided by the Commissioner of Fire and Emergency Services.

The primary objective of this study was to determine whether current risk management
practices in dynamic emergency incidents are compliant with AS31000.

A subsequent

objective was to define the internal context of dynamic risk management within the operational
incident management and response section of the Department of Fire and Emergency Service
(DFES).

The internal context was defined by either the formal documentation of the

organisation (SAHB 436), or in the absence of such documentation, the collective beliefs that
serve to form the operating consensus. As the literature review identified an absence of formal
documentation or guidance that established the internal context, the first phase of this study
utilised ethnographic qualitative research to document the beliefs and dynamic risk
management culture of incident controllers within DFES.

The absence of research in the field of rescue science equates to a lack of priors and little
guidance regarding study design. The dynamic and irregular nature of emergency operations
(DFES, 2012a, 2013a, 2015a, 2015b) resulted in field observation being considered
inappropriate by the study team. Further, it was deemed critical to ensure the design of the
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study was not only appropriate to answer the research question posed; but would also yield
sufficient data to ensure the validity of results. These limitations are addressed through careful
study design.

The use of a semi-structured interview and subsequent in-depth structured survey enabled
exploration and documentation of the beliefs, understanding and attitudes of a specific
population of incident controllers within DFES which ultimately form the internal context of
the risk management process (Silverman, 2011; Taylor, 2005).

Using this approach,

information rich data was collected from the target population.

The limited availability of quantitative data was addressed through the use of Bayesian
theorem. In contrast to the traditional frequentist approach, Bayesian statistics provide robust
analysis with small data sets (Cutcliffe, Schmidt, Lucas & Bass, 2012; Salkind, 2010).
Posterior probability is established through repeated use of Bayesian theorem on empirical data
collected during the experiment itself (Wong, Warren & Kawchuk, 2010). In this manner
Bayesian analysis is better suited to guide decisions within the context of practical dynamic
emergency operations (Ferson, unknown; Goldstein, 2006).

3.2

Phase One

Phase one involved ethnographic qualitative interactive observation of 20 serving officers of
the Department of Fire and Emergency Services (DFES) between September 2014 and
November 2014. Semi-structured interviews and subsequent in-depth structured surveys were
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conducted focusing on the participant’s risk attitudes and beliefs. The participation of one
candidate was interrupted by an incident call out, resulting in 19 interviews and surveys being
available for analysis.

O’Brien (2002) identifies that the number of participants should be guided by the richness of
the data. Given the relatively limited population of incident controllers within the DFES Fire
& Rescue Service of 274 officers (DFES Human Services, 2016) and the richness of the data
collected, the 19 participants representing 7% of the overall population was considered
sufficient for the study.

Data from interviews was analysed using customised Excel spreadsheets created by the lead
researcher to establish similar trends related to the understanding of risk and risk management
in dynamic situations in order to establish organisational context. Results assisted to establish
the internal context of emergency services in relation to dynamic risk management. Bayesian
analysis was used to quantify risk acceptance thresholds which further established risk
thresholds of the participants.

In this manner, the overall probability of specific outcomes can be determined using the
formula:
𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵) = 𝑃(𝐴) × 𝑃(𝐵)

Where
𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵) is the probability that both A and B occur;
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𝑃(𝐴) is the probability that A will occur; and
𝑃(𝐵) is the probability that B will occur.

The conditional probability (P) of a specific injury being sustained (A) given an injury is
sustained during a certain task at an incident (B) can be determined using the formula:
𝑃(𝐴|𝐵) =

𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵)
𝑃(𝐵)

Where
𝑃(𝐴|𝐵) is the probability that A will occur given the fact that B has already occurred;
𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵) is the probability that both A and B occur; and
𝑃(𝐵) is the probability that B will occur.
In order to determine risk tolerance where certainty is not achieved a certainty factor (Blamey,
2008; Lucas, 2008; Roventa & Spircu, 2009) was applied. Using an approach derived from
Roventa and Spircu (2009) in consideration of the responses of the entire study population to
the semi-structure interview the following certainty factor was developed for the analysis:
𝐼𝑓 𝑃(𝐴) ≥ 1.5 × 𝑃(𝐵) 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑃(𝐴) 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦
𝐼𝑓 𝑃(𝐵) ≥ 1.5 × 𝑃(𝐴) 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑃(𝐵) 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦
𝐼𝑓 𝑃(𝐴) < 1.5 × 𝑃(𝐵) 𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑓 𝑃(𝐵) < 1.5 × 𝑃(𝐴)𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒
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3.3

Phase Two

The objective of phase two of this study was to interrogate existing data sets to establish
conditional probabilities that would enhance the understanding of the internal and external
context of dynamic risk management within the operational incident management and response
section of DFES. Thus a retrospective analysis of safety and incident reports from the DFES
Health and Safety data base between January 1st 2001 and January 1st 2015 was conducted. All
reports related to incidents responded to by the frontline operational arm of DFES. All
information that could identify personnel was redacted by DFES prior to collection by the
investigator. 1,997 individual reports were initially analysed. To ensure data reflected injuries
sustained during operational events, the following inclusion criterion were applied:
1. Event must relate to a specific operational incident; and
2. An injury must have occurred or the potential for injury must be identified.

For the purposes of this study injury was defined as any adverse outcome that was physical or
psychological in nature, whilst the term operational incident was defined as an incident
responded to by DFES personnel that was assigned an internal incident identification number.
Following application of the inclusion criteria 666 reports were identified as suitable for
analysis.

Data was initially categorised according to:
1. Activity (being the primary task undertaken at the time of the reported incident);
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2. Initiating event (being the risk source);
3. Nature of the injury reported;
4. Actual severity of the consequence reported; and
5. Potential severity of the consequence reported.

Based on the report descriptions and the findings of the literature review, 12 categories of
activity were determined:
1. Breathing Apparatus – where the use of self-contained breathing apparatus was reported
as the primary activity being undertaken;
2. Bushfire Fighting – including grass, scrub and forest firefighting efforts;
3. DBA – Direct Brigade Alarm response to monitored premises fire alarms;
4. Driving – driving of appliances either to or during an emergency incident;
5. Environmental – animal related reports including rescues, bites and stings;
6. Firefighting – all structural and property fire including vehicles but not including
reported hazardous materials;
7. Hazmat – Hazardous Materials response;
8. Not Reported – reports that did not identify the activity undertaken at the time of event;
9. RCR – Road Crash Rescue response to vehicle extrication of all types;
10. Rescue – Rescue of all types not involving vehicle extrication;
11. Storm – storm response; and
12. Suicide Response – response to suicide.
Based on the report descriptions 22 initiating events or risk sources were determined:
1. Animal – all animals other than humans;
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2. Blast/Explosion – an explosion from any source;
3. Communications – communications procedures related to the incident;
4. Electrical – electrocution, electric shock or other electricity related incident;
5. Entrapment – entrapment of person not attributed to other cause;
6. Environmental – natural events or sources not related to animals;
7. Equipment failure – failure of a specified piece of equipment;
8. Exposure (asbestos) – exposure to asbestos particles;
9. Exposure (biohazard) – exposure to body fluids;
10. Exposure (chemical) – exposure to a chemical not otherwise classified;
11. Exposure (hazmat fire) – exposure to chemicals that are actively involved in fire;
12. Exposure (noise) – exposure to loud noise;
13. Exposure (psychological) – exposure to events reported to (or have the potential to)
cause negative psychological impacts;
14. Exposure (smoke) – exposure to smoke and other unburned products of combustion
not including hazmat fire;
15. Impact – physical impact of one object on another, typically involving the person
reporting;
16. Impaired vision – visual impairment;
17. Not reported – no risk source reported;
18. Operator error – an unintentional or intentional action by a person that resulted in the
injury;
19. Other person – injury or event initiated by another person not relating to violence;
20. Physical strain – muscular or joint strain from operational response efforts;
21. Thermal – extreme heat or cold;
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22. Violence – physical assault by another person.
Based on the report descriptions 30 categories of injuries were determined:
1. Abdominal – injuries to the abdominal region;
2. Absorption – absorption through the skin or mucous membranes;
3. Ankle – injuries to the ankle;
4. Arm – injuries to the arm not otherwise classified;
5. Back – injuries to the back that were not skeletal in nature, not including neck injuries;
6. Chest – injuries to the chest region;
7. Ear – injuries to one or both ears;
8. Elbow – injuries to the elbow;
9. Eye – injuries to one or both eyes;
10. Face – facial injuries not including the head, neck, eyes or ears;
11. Finger – injuries to one or multiple fingers;
12. Foot – injuries to one or both feet;
13. General – exposures to a substance not otherwise defined in the reports;
14. Groin – injuries to the groin region;
15. Hand – injuries to one or both hands;
16. Head/Spinal – injuries to the head or spine that do or have the potential to cause
structural skeletal damage;
17. Heat illness – all forms of heat illness;
18. Hip – injuries to one or both hips;
19. Ingestion – swallowing of a substance;
20. Inhalation – inhalation of a substance;
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21. Knee – injuries to one or both knees;
22. Leg – injuries to one or both legs not otherwise classified;
23. Multiple – multiple areas of injury;
24. Neck – neck injury not related to structural damage of the spine;
25. Nil – no injury suffered;
26. Not reported – no injury or exposure reported;
27. Psychological – exposure to events reported to (or have the potential to) cause negative
psychological impacts;
28. Shoulder – injuries to one or both shoulders;
29. Thermal – burns as a result from heat or cold; and
30. Wrist – injuries to one or both wrists.
The severity of the consequence was extrapolated from the report description and classified
according to the DFES Risk Matrix (DFES, 2015g):
1. Insignificant – no treatment required; no lost time;
2. Minor – first aid treatment only; no lost time;
3. Moderate – medical treatment; lost time – less than 10 days lost;
4. Major – hospitalisation/significant injury; lost time – more than 10 days lost; and
5. Catastrophic – severe permanent injury / disability / fatality(ies).
The potential severity of the consequence was determined by selecting the highest consequence
from both the reports collected and review of comparative incident reports from FEMA (2012).
The same categories of consequence were applied as above.
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The activity at the time of injury and nature of the injury sustained was extrapolated from the
incident reports to facilitate probability modelling; determination of severity of the actual and
potential consequence; and calculation of incident likelihood. Likelihood was determined
using the formula:
𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 =

𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 (15 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠)

Likelihood was defined in accordance with the DFES Risk Matrix (DFES, 2015g):
1. Rare – may only occur in exceptional circumstances (once in 10 years);
2. Unlikely – could occur at some time (once in 5 years);
3. Moderate – should occur sometime (once in 2 years);
4. Likely – will probably occur in most circumstances (at least once per year); and
5. Very likely – expected to occur in most circumstances (more than once per year).

Data relating to the type of activity undertaken at the time of injury and the nature of the injury
sustained was analysed using Bayesian statistics to determine the overall and conditional
probability of specific injuries being sustained during the various tasks undertaken during an
emergency incident.

The analysis was repeated for each activity, risk source and injury to determine the conditional
probability of:
1. A specific injury being sustained (A) given an injury is sustained during a certain task
at an incident (B);
2. A certain consequence severity occurring based on historical data (A) given an injury
is sustained during a certain task at an incident (B); and
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3. A certain potential consequence was possible (A) given an injury sustained during a
certain task at an incident.

One limitation of the study was potential reluctance of participants to provide answers, beliefs
or attitudes that they felt may not be viewed favourably by superior officers. Reluctance to
participate within this study on the grounds was addressed through a reassurance of the
anonymity of all data collected. Despite this reassurance, some potential participants elected
not to participate. This may have resulted in some bias when defining the internal context of
the organisation.

During the initial stages of development of the study proposal a concern was raised that due to
the relatively small size of the operational service of DFES; factors such as age, rank and
gender could be used to identify participants. Therefore, participants age, rank and gender
were not recorded to ensure the anonymity which subsequently limited the potential for data
analysis on these characteristics.

Another limitation was the limited injury priors available for analysis. The accuracy of
documentation, potential reluctance of frontline staff to report incidents and limited
information documented in recorded incidents may lead to bias in calculated probabilities. A
benefit of the use of Bayesian analysis was that future studies can build upon these initial
findings to enhance the accuracy of calculated probabilities as more data become available.
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Only a single emergency service within Western Australia was examined in this study. The
internal contexts between different emergency services within the same state and the same
emergency service in different states will inevitably vary to some degree. The results of this
study are directly applicable to dynamic risk management in emergency incidents within the
DFES in Western Australia, but do not necessarily represent the internal contexts of other
emergency services.
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4.0 Results and Discussion
This chapter discusses the profile of participants in phase 1 of the study. Results and analysis
of the respondents’ interview questions and structured survey are reported upon. The results
and analysis of the 666 incident reports included in phase 2 of the study are also detailed in this
chapter.

4.1

Phase One

The objective of this study was to define the internal and external context of dynamic risk
management within the operational incident management and response section of the
Department of Fire and Emergency Service (DFES). The semi-structured interview was
specifically designed to extrapolate and document the participant’s understanding and attitudes
towards ‘traditional’ and dynamic risk management.

Subsequently four questions were asked during the interview:
1. How do you define risk?
2. How do you manage risk in a dynamic emergency environment compared to other
situations and contexts?
3. How do you decide whether risks are acceptable in a dynamic emergency environment?
4. Does the risk management process differ in the dynamic emergency environment
compared to other situations? If yes, then how?

The profile of participants was collected from questions within the structured survey. The 19
participants were all operational incident controllers at various ranks within DFES. Both
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metropolitan and regional staff were included in the study. Table 1 shows the number of years’
experience of the participants:

Experience

Number Percent

Nil

0

0%

0-5

0

0%

6-10

1

5%

11-15

5

26%

16-20

2

11%

21-25

3

16%

25+

7

37%

Other

1

5%

Table 1: Comparison of years’ experience of participants
As shown in Table 1, no respondents had less than six years’ experience. This was not
unexpected due to entry level officers requiring a minimum Senior Firefighter qualification
prior to application which takes five years to obtain. By a fractional margin the majority of
participants held in excess of 20 years’ experience (53%). Without further research there
appears to be no specific reason for this. The participant whom selected “other” did not provide
further elaboration.

The second comparison focused upon the basis of the highest level of training or education the
participant had received in AS31000.
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Answer

Number

Percent

None

3

17%

Short Course

1

6%

In House

12

67%

Undergraduate 0

0%

Postgraduate

1

6%

Other

1

6%

Table 2: Comparison of training in AS31000

The results overwhelmingly illustrate the majority of participants believed they had received
“In House” training in the AS31000 risk management process. The participant who marked
“Other” provided clarification that risk management had been discussed as a component of
other courses but had not been specifically addressed in its own right. One participant did not
provide an answer to the question. These results support the findings of Penney (2013)
whereby professional craft knowledge was considered to be passed down through generations
of firefighters as opposed to being formally studied through external providers. The results
also appear to support the initial conclusions of the literature review that emergency services
may have developed risk management attitudes and beliefs that are internally valid (Ash &
Smallman, 2010; Fender, 2003; Jacobs, 2010; Lofflin & Kipp, 1997), but are not necessarily
compliant with AS31000 which requires internal context to be explicitly defined. Such
attitudes may prevail in an apparently successful manner whilst they remain unchallenged,
however should they be examined in detail by an external party it is foreseeable that the
practices would face at least some level of criticism. The level of criticism would likely be
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significant should the internal risk attitudes be found to both be inconsistent with AS31000 and
contribute towards the injury or death of emergency services personnel.

The third comparison focused upon the basis of the highest level of training or education the
participant had received in Dynamic Risk Management.
Answer

Number

Percent

None

4

21%

Short Course

2

11%

In House

12

63%

Undergraduate 0

0%

Postgraduate

0

0%

Other

1

5%

Table 3: Comparison of training in Dynamic Risk Management

The participant who marked “Other” provided clarification they had received “In House”
training in Dynamic Risk Management. These findings are consistent with those in Table 2
and appear consistent with the literature which did not report any tertiary risk management
training (Ash & Smallman, 2010; Fender, 2003; Lofflin & Kipp, 1997) undertaken by
personnel in other fire services.

Participants were also questioned as to whether they had been injured at an emergency incident
being controlled by another person. These results are shown in Table 4.
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Answer

Number

Percent

Yes

9

47%

No

10

53%

Table 4: Comparison of participants injured at an incident controlled by other person.

These results indicate an almost even distribution of those participants who had and had not
been injured at incidents controlled by other parties. As a result of these findings the structured
survey was subject to additional analysis to determine whether being injured under another
person’s command resulted in certain bias. This additional analysis is discussed in Chapter 5.
The fifth comparison focused upon the basis of whether participants had been responsible for
managing risk at an emergency incident where another responder had been severely injured.

Answer

Number

Percent

Yes

0

0%

No

19

100%

Table 5: Comparison of participants had been responsible for managing risk at an incident
where another person was severely injured.

As reported in Table 5, all participants identified they had never been responsible for managing
risk at an incident where another person was severely injured. Further investigation, beyond
the scope of this study would be required to determine whether answers to this question were
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accurate or skewed as a result of participants not wanting to admit to a person being injured at
an incident they were responsible for managing due to fears of potential professional
ramifications.
The final comparison focused upon the participants’ perception regarding their own level of
expertise in risk management specific to emergency services response. These results are
detailed in Table 6.
Answer

Number

Percent

Cannot effectively manage risk

0

0%

1

5%

14

74%

4

21%

Excel at managing risk in all emergency services contexts

0

0%

Other

0

0%

Can effectively manage risk in limited emergency services
contexts
Can effectively manage risk in most emergency services
contexts
Can effectively manage risk in every emergency services
context

Table 6: Comparison of participants’ perception of risk management expertise.

These results demonstrate an overwhelming majority of participants perceive they could
personally effectively manage risk in most emergency services contexts.

This was not

unexpected as DFES is identified as an “all hazards agency” (DFES, 2013c, 2015c, 2015f).
The results also suggest that participants collectively believe they can effectively manage risk
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in various emergency service contexts regardless of the level of training they have received in
AS31000. In stark contradiction to SAHB 436:2013 these results suggest an internal attitude
that AS31000 is not necessarily required for effective risk management in dynamic emergency
contexts. This conclusion is consistent with the reported beliefs of personnel in international
fire services (Ash and Smallman, 2010; Jacobs, 2010) suggesting that for risk management to
be compliant with AS31000 it must be ingrained as part of the core culture of the fire service.

The first question asked of participants in the semi-structured interview was “How do you
define risk?” AS31000 (s2.1) defines the term “Risk” as the “effect of uncertainty on
objectives.” Further notes are provided in AS31000 (s2.1) as:
1. An effect is a deviation from the expected – positive and/or negative;
2. Objectives can have different aspects (such as financial, health and safety, and
environmental goals) and can apply at different levels (such as strategic, organisation
wide, project, product and process);
3. Risk is often characterised by reference to potential events and consequences or a
combination of these;
4. Risk is often expressed in terms of a combination of the consequences of an event
(including changes in circumstances) and the associated likelihood of occurrence; and
5. Uncertainty is the state, even partial, of deficiency of information related to
understanding or knowledge of an event, its consequence, or likelihood.
Whilst all participants responses included at least part of the associated factors identified in the
notes of AS31000 (s2.1) that risk is a consideration of consequences and likelihood, only one
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participant (5%) provided the answer “it is the effect of uncertainty on objectives.”

Five

participants (26%) provided answers that were specific to emergency response without
consideration of the greater application of risk and one participant provided the restrictive
definition “risk is the potential to injure me.”

Consistent with the findings of Tissington

(2004) these answers suggest participants generally have a perception of risk as the practical
consideration of consequence and likelihood as it applies to a reactive emergency environment
as opposed to a considered and managed process. This understanding of risk is not absolutely
unique to the study group, with similar definitions reported by Reinhardt-Klein (2010) but is
different to that of at least one other emergency service in Australia (ACTESA, unknown).
This suggests the study group have adopted a definition of risk that is reasonably consistent
throughout their population and contextualised to their perception of reality but does not
consider all elements detailed in AS31000.

The second question asked of participants was “How do you manage risk in a dynamic
emergency environment compared to other situations and contexts?” In response, nearly all
participants identified that risk management in dynamic contexts was based on a similar
process to risk management in other situations but with limited information available and with
restricted time frames in which to make decisions. Two participants (10%) expressed the
opinion that dynamic risk management required more “forward thinking” than risk
management in other situations. These responses again suggest the study group have adopted
a definition of risk that is reasonably consistent throughout their population and contextualised
to their perception of reality but does not consider all elements detailed in AS31000, especially
when consideration is given to the example of the special forces soldier in a hostage situation
detailed in SAHB436 (p45).
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Eleven participants (58%) also expressed that they managed risk in dynamic emergency
environments according to how they believed their organisation expected them to do so or that
they managed risk in accordance with organisational procedures and protocols. This suggests
the majority of participants believed they managed risk using the same risk attitudes as their
organisation, a notion that is analysed further in chapter 5 with consideration that the literature
review found an absence of documented organisational risk thresholds and attitudes.

Responses from the study group to the third question “How do you decide whether risks are
acceptable in a dynamic emergency environment?” were varied. Five participants (26%)
reported they relied on organisational procedures and protocols; nine participants (47%)
reported they relied on personal prior experience to determine whether risks were acceptable;
three (16%) participants stated they simply relied on whether they believed the risk was
acceptable to themselves personally; and two (10%) participants responded that in the case of
“life involvement” (being the fire services terminology for when potential consequences
include the loss of occupant life) then all risks are acceptable.

Variation in answers provided represents significant variance in the risk thresholds between
incident controllers within the same organisation.

Conflicts between risk attitudes will

foreseeably lead to increased risk at an emergency incident as additional uncertainty is
introduced when individuals work together to form Incident Management Teams or are
responsible for different sectors within the same emergency incident. When considered in
conjunction with the answers provided to question two, the variance in risk thresholds between
participants suggests an absence of a defined organisational internal risk context that may
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otherwise guide participants towards similar answers. This notion is consistent with the
literature (ACTESA, date unknown; Fender, 2003) and reinforces the conclusion that for risk
management to be compliant with AS31000 it must be ingrained as part of the core culture of
the fire service inclusive of explicitly defined risk tolerances. These findings are explored more
in the discussion of the results of the structured survey.

The final question posed to participants was “Does the risk management process differ in the
dynamic emergency environment compared to other situations? If yes, then how?” Responses
provided by participants were far less varied in this instance. Eight participants (42%) stated
there was no difference in the process, however four of those eight participants also stated the
time frame available for completing the risk assessment was significantly reduced during
dynamic emergency environments. Interestingly, of those eight participants one also stated
that risk tolerance is significantly higher during dynamic emergency operations compared to
other situations which suggests fluctuating risk thresholds depending on the participant’s
evolving perception of the severity of an incident. Only one participant (5%) identified that
the risk management process had to be repeated multiple times throughout the emergency
incident, suggesting the remaining participants did not consider repeated risk application of the
risk management process necessary. This is in contradiction to SAHB 436:2013.

Ten participants (53%) stated that the risk management process did differ in the dynamic
emergency environment compared to other situations. Those participants all identified that the
process changed due to the significant reduction in both available information on which to
make decisions and available time to gather further information. One of the ten participants
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clarified they felt “pushed to do things you wouldn’t normally do due to expectations and
pressure” indicating they operated at risk thresholds they personally felt were unacceptable.

Of all 19 participants only one (5%) stated the dynamic risk management process was reactive
as opposed to being a thought out process. These findings appear to contradict the previous
findings of Ash and Smallman (2010), Fender (2003) and Naikar (2010) all of whom identified
decision making during dynamic emergency incidents is reactive and based on recognition of
specific cues. Whilst this finding must be interpreted with some caution due to the relatively
small sample size of this study, it is supported by the answers provided by the study group to
the second question posed in the interview. Subsequently, this suggests that risk management
in dynamic emergency situations within the study population may be more aligned to AS31000
than other selected fire services.

One participant (5%) stated they were unsure whether the risk management process differed in
the dynamic emergency environment compared to other situations.

The first question in the structured survey required participants to identify the severity of
various potential consequences.

From the answers provided, probability analysis was

completed across the entire sample population. Conditional probability was then calculated on
the basis that participants had or had not been previously injured at an incident (from the results
reported in Table 4). These results were compared to the severity assigned to the consequence
in the DFES Risk Matrix (2015g) shown in Table 7. In this table the highest probability for
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the entire study population (represented in the “All” column) is highlighted in blue; the highest
conditional probability of the previously injured group (represented in the “Injured” column)
is highlighted in orange; the highest conditional probability of the group never having been
injured (represented in the “Never” column) is highlighted in green; and the severity assigned
in accordance with the DFES Risk Matrix (DFES, 2015g) outlined in red.

Analysis of the results revealed there is a conditional probability of 0.00 (zero) for all
participants assigning the same severity to a consequence given the event being realised. Only
in a single instance a subgroup completely agreed on the severity of a consequence, being the
non-injured group agreeing that the death of a rescuer was of catastrophic severity (represented
by a conditional probability of 1.00).

Further analysis of Table 7 revealed there was an equal probability between the group that had
never been injured, a conditional probability of 0.2 that the survey groups’ majority severity
perception would align with the severity assigned using the DFES Risk Matrix (2015g). Whilst
some variance was expected by the lead researcher due to potential differences in individuals’
perception of the consequence realised, the conditional probability of 0.2 signifies agreement
between participants and DFES in the perception of consequence severity of only a single
occurrence each year (refer to the analysis of consequence likelihood on page 41 for calculation
details). It is therefore concluded that internal context of risk attitudes is not harmonious
amongst the study group and may lead to conflicting risk management during dynamic
emergency situations or post incident analysis.

pg. 54

Descriptive analysis of the results illustrated in Table 7 provide a mean probability of 0.612
(standard deviation of 0.142) that the entire survey group will agree on the severity of any given
consequence. This further supports the findings of the potential for conflicting risk attitudes
between incident controllers and parties conducting post incident analysis.

Rating

Moderate

Major

Catastrophic

Injured

Never

All

Injured

Never

All

Injured

Never

All

Injured

Never

All

Injured

Never

Near miss cut finger
Near miss broken arm
Near miss death of
rescuer
Near miss exposure to
acutely toxic
material
Near miss exposure to
hazardous
material with
health effects
that may take
20 years to
occur
Scratch or
dent to a
vehicle
Cut finger
requiring first
aid treatment
Broken arm
requiring
hospitalisation
Death of a
rescuer
Exposure to
acutely toxic
hazardous
material
requiring

Minor

All

Consequence

Insignificant

0.42

0.44

0.40

0.53

0.44

0.60

0.05

0.11

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.05

0.00

0.10

0.21

0.22

0.20

0.58

0.56

0.60

0.16

0.22

0.10

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.11

0.00

0.20

0.42

0.44

0.40

0.47

0.56

0.40

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.05

0.00

0.10

0.11

0.00

0.20

0.63

0.78

0.50

0.21

0.22

0.20

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.05

0.00

0.10

0.26

0.00

0.50

0.47

0.78

0.20

0.21

0.22

0.20

0.26

0.22

0.30

0.68

0.67

0.70

0.05

0.11

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.11

0.00

0.20

0.83

0.88

0.80

0.06

0.13

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.11

0.00

0.20

0.68

0.67

0.70

0.21

0.33

0.10

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.05

0.11

0.00

0.95

0.89

1.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.63

0.56

0.70

0.37

0.44

0.30
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hospital
admission
Exposure to
hazardous
material that
results in lung
damage only
evident 20
years post
exposure
Inhaling
asbestos
particulates
and dust as a
result of
rescue
activities
Exposure to
silica
particulates
and dust as a
result of
rescue
activities
Exposure to
glass
particulates
and dusts as a
result of
rescue
activities
Damage to a
vehicle
resulting in
$1000 damage
Damage to a
vehicle
resulting in
$20,000
damage
Damage to the
environment
that does not
result in long
term impact
Damage to the
environment
resulting in
long term
impact
Lung tissue
damage
without
respiratory
impairment

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.11

0.00

0.20

0.42

0.44

0.40

0.47

0.56

0.40

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.06

0.00

0.10

0.61

0.67

0.50

0.33

0.33

0.40

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.26

0.11

0.40

0.63

0.78

0.60

0.11

0.11

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.06

0.00

0.11

0.17

0.11

0.22

0.72

0.78

0.67

0.06

0.11

0.00

0.05

0.00

0.10

0.79

0.89

0.70

0.16

0.11

0.20

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.42

0.44

0.40

0.42

0.56

0.30

0.16

0.00

0.30

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.05

0.00

0.10

0.68

0.44

0.90

0.26

0.56

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.05

0.00

0.10

0.42

0.33

0.50

0.37

0.44

0.30

0.16

0.22

0.10

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.37

0.22

0.50

0.58

0.78

0.40

0.05

0.00

0.10
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Lung tissue
damage that
limits physical
activity

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.53

0.44

0.60

0.47

0.56

0.40

Table 7: Perceptions of consequence severity.
An individual’s beliefs and expectations can significantly affect the internal context of the risk
management process (SAHB 436:2013). To investigate how this may be a factor in risk
management during dynamic emergency operations, the second question of the survey required
participants to identify their beliefs regarding external and personal risk attitudes and
expectations using a Likert scale.
study population.

These results are detailed in Table 8 as a percentage of the

In this table the highest percentage for the entire study population

(represented in the “All” column) is highlighted in blue; the highest percentage of the
previously injured group (represented in the “Injured” column) is highlighted in orange; and
the highest percentage of the group never having been injured (represented in the “Never”
column) is highlighted ingreen.

Belief

Strongly

Disagree (%)

Neutral (%)

Agree (%)

Strongly Agree

Disagree (%)
All

Injured

Never

All

Injured

Never

Never

Injured

All

All

Never

There is an
expectation
that
emergency
services
personnel will
risk their own
lives to save
others
There is an
expectation
that
emergency

Never

Injured

11

11

10

11

0

20

5

11

0

53

44

60

21

33

10

16

11

20

11

0

20

21

11

30

47

67

30

5

11

0

Group

Injured

All

Participant

(%)
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services
personnel will
risk their own
lives to save
property
There is an
expectation
that
emergency
services
personnel will
risk their own
lives to save
the
environment
Emergency
services
personnel
have a moral
obligation to
put
themselves at
a higher level
of risk than
the general
public in the
course of their
duties

21

11

30

16

11

20

37

56

20

26

22

30

0

0

0

5

0

10

16

11

20

5

11

0

68

67

70

5

11

0

Table 8: Participant beliefs.
Analysis of these results reveals that the overwhelming majority of the entire study group
(74%), as well as the both subgroups (Injured 77% and Never Injured 70%), believed there
were external expectations that emergency services personnel would risk their own lives to
save others. By comparison only 52% of the entire study group (Injured 78% and Never Injured
30%) believed there were external expectations that emergency services personnel would risk
their own lives to save property. This difference in attitudes between the Injured and Never
Injured populations appears to suggest personnel who had a higher personal risk threshold may
be more likely to be injured during emergency operations, however further research is required
to confirm this hypothesis.
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Analysis of the responses to the statement “There is an expectation that emergency services
personnel will risk their own lives to save the environment” was less conclusive but appeared
to suggest less belief amongst the study group that this was the case (37% of the total study
group stating they either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement).

In order to further define the risk attitudes and tolerance of the study group, participants were
required to identify whether potential scenarios were either acceptable or unacceptable.
Participants were first required to answer the question in the context that they were personally
exposed to the risk source, the subsequent context was that the participant was responsible for
other responders and it was these responders who were exposed to the risk source.

Results are detailed in Table 9, shown as overall probability and subsequent conditional
probability based on whether the participant had been previously injured at an emergency
incident. Where results were equivalent between the two contexts they are highlighted in the
table. For the entire study population (represented in the “All” column) equivalence is
highlighted in blue; equivalence amongst the previously injured group (represented in the
“Injured” column) is highlighted in orange; and equivalence amongst the group never having
been injured (represented in the “Never” column) is highlighted in green.

Where the

conditional probability of risk acceptance is higher in a given scenario amongst the “Injured”
population the cell is outlined in blue; the cell is highlighted in red when the conditional
probability of risk acceptance is higher amongst the “Never” population.
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Analysis revealed a probability of certainty (where probability equals 1.00) amongst the study
group of 0.143, meaning there is a probability of 0.857 that participants did not collectively
absolutely agree on risk tolerance attitudes or thresholds.

Further analysis revealed a

probability of only 0.286 that all participants shared the same risk tolerance across the
presented scenarios. This probability increased to 0.381 amongst the “Injured” population
whilst there was no change in the probability of agreeance amongst the “Never” population
compared to all participants. One potential explanations for the increased consensus of risk
acceptance amongst the “Injured” population may be that those participants whom were
previously injured held a higher risk tolerance and therefore were more likely to undertake
hazardous tasks that may result in injury compared to the “Never” group.

Risk acceptance where the exposure was personal was equal to or higher than the risk
acceptance where exposure was to personnel under the participant’s command in all scenarios
with the exception of “entering a toxic smoke plume to rescue a person where there is a low or
high probability of developing cancer” where the risk acceptance was nominally lower when
the exposure was personal. No justification for this result could be determined with any
certainty by the lead researcher and requires additional study. These results suggest a tendency
for participants to accept a higher level of risk where the consequences will not extend to other
persons.

In order to determine risk tolerance where certainty is not achieved a certainty factor was
applied using an approach derived from Roventa and Spircu (2009). Results of this analysis for
each scenario are provided in Table 9. When considering risk tolerance with limited certainty
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the probability of risk tolerance agreement between personal and personnel exposure increased
to from 0.143 to 0.761 across the entire study population.

Risk to Participant Themselves
Risk Tolerance

Unacceptable
INJURED

NEVER

ALL

INJURED

1.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.00

1.00

Entering a burning building
to rescue a person where
there
is
a
moderate
probability of being severely
injured or killed.

0.63

Entering a burning building
to rescue a person where
there is a high probability of
being severely injured or
killed.

0.16

Unacceptable – limited certainty as
0.84≥1.5x0.16

Unacceptable – limited certainty as
0.95≥1.5x0.05

Rescuing a person from a
vehicle where there is a low
probability of being exposed
to dust that may cause
immediate lung damage.

0.95

0.79

Rescuing a person from a
vehicle where there is a
moderate probability of
being exposed to dust that
may cause immediate lung
damage.

0.47

Rescuing a person from a
vehicle where there is a high
probability of being exposed
to dust that may cause
immediate lung damage.

0.37

Acceptable –
0.65≥1.5x0.37
0.00

1.00

0.90

Acceptable –
0.95≥1.5x0.05
0.56

0.37

0.84

0.05

limited

0.40

0.53

0.44

certainty

1.00

0.00

certainty

0.44

0.30

as

0.70

0.10

as

0.60

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.47

0.56

0.40

0.53

0.44

0.60

0.10

0.95

1.00

0.90

Inconclusive

0.05

0.00

0.89

0.70

Acceptable –
0.79≥1.5x0.21
0.32

0.33

0.21

limited

0.30

0.68

0.11

0.30

certainty

0.67

as

0.70

Unacceptable – limited certainty as
0.68≥1.5x0.32

Inconclusive

0.33

1.00

Acceptable - Certain

limited

0.30

NEVER

ALL

1.00

0.70

INJURED

NEVER

1.00

0.56

ALL

INJURED

Entering a burning building
to rescue a person where
there is a low probability of
being severely injured or
killed.

Acceptable - Certain

NEVER

ALL

Context and Risk

Acceptable

Risk to Personnel Under the
Command of the Participant
Acceptable
Unacceptable

0.40

0.63

0.67

0.60

Unacceptable – limited certainty as
0.63≥1.5x0.37

0.21

0.22

0.20

0.79

0.78

0.80

Unacceptable – limited certainty as
0.79≥1.5x021
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Entering a toxic smoke
plume to rescue a person
where there is a low
probability of developing
cancer.

0.58

0.56

0.60

0.42

0.44

0.40

Entering a toxic smoke
plume to rescue a person
where there is a moderate
probability of developing
cancer.

0.26

Unacceptable – limited certainty as
0.74≥1.5x0.26

Unacceptable – limited certainty as
0.74≥1.5x0.26

Entering a toxic smoke
plume to rescue a person
where there is a high
probability of developing
cancer.

0.16

0.26

Unacceptable – limited certainty as
0.84≥1.5x0.16

Unacceptable – limited certainty as
0.74≥1.5x0.26

Rescuing a person from a
vehicle where there is a low
probability of being exposed
to dust that may cause long
term lung damage.

0.84

0.74

Rescuing a person from a
vehicle where there is a
moderate probability of
being exposed to dust that
may cause long term lung
damage.
Rescuing a person from a
vehicle where there is a high
probability of being exposed
to dust that may cause long
term lung damage.

0.32

Unacceptable – limited certainty as
0.79≥1.5x0.21

Unacceptable – limited certainty as
0.79≥1.5x0.21

Entering a burning building
to rescue a child where there
is a low probability of being
severely injured or killed.

1.00

1.00

Entering a burning building
to rescue a child where there
is a moderate probability of
being severely injured or
killed.

0.79

Entering a burning building
to rescue a child where there
is a high probability of being
severely injured or killed.

0.21

Unacceptable – limited certainty as
0.79≥1.5x0.21

Unacceptable – limited certainty as
0.89≥1.5x0.11

Entering a burning building
to rescue a colleague where
there is a low probability of
being severely injured or
killed.

1.00

0.95

0.11

0.89

0.30

0.20

0.90

Acceptable –
0.84≥1.5x0.16
0.22

0.78

0.50

Acceptable –
0.63≥1.5x0.37

Inconclusive

0.22

0.63

0.74

0.84

0.16

limited

0.40

0.68

0.78

0.89

0.11

certainty

0.78

0.70

0.80

0.10

as

0.60

0.26

0.22

0.22

1.00

0.26

0.22

limited

0.30

0.20

0.60

Acceptable –
0.74≥1.5x0.26

0.37

0.74

0.74

0.26

limited

0.30

0.74

0.22

0.50

certainty

0.78

as

0.70

0.78

0.80

0.00

0.40

certainty

0.78

as

0.70

Unacceptable – limited certainty as
0.68≥1.5x0.32

Unacceptable – limited certainty as
0.74≥1.5x0.26

0.21

0.21

0.22

1.00

0.20

1.00

0.79

0.00

0.78

0.00

0.80

0.00

Acceptable - Certain

0.67

0.90

Acceptable –
0.79≥1.5x0.21
0.11

1.00

1.00

Acceptable - Certain

1.00

0.20

1.00

0.79

0.78

0.80

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.40

0.47

0.33

0.60

0.10

0.89

0.89

0.90

Acceptable - Certain

0.21

limited

0.30

0.22

0.79

0.00

0.33

certainty

0.89

0.00

0.10

as

0.70

0.00

0.53

0.67

Inconclusive

0.11

0.11

1.00

0.90

Acceptable –
0.95≥1.5x0.05

0.05

limited

0.00

0.10

certainty

as
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Entering a burning building
to rescue a colleague where
there
is
a
moderate
probability of being severely
injured or killed.

0.79

0.67

0.90

Entering a burning building
to rescue a colleague where
there is a high probability of
being severely injured or
killed.

0.37

Unacceptable – limited certainty as
0.63≥1.5x0.37

Unacceptable – limited certainty as
0.84≥1.5x0.16

Entering a burning building
to save the property where
there is a low probability of
being severely injured or
killed.

0.84

0.68

Entering a burning building
to save the property where
there
is
a
moderate
probability of being severely
injured or killed.

0.16

Unacceptable – limited certainty as
0.84≥1.5x0.16

Unacceptable – limited certainty as
0.84≥1.5x0.16

Entering a burning building
to save the property where
there is a high probability of
being severely injured or
killed.

0.00

0.00

Acceptable –
0.79≥1.5x0.21
0.33

0.78

0.11

0.00

limited

0.40

0.90

Acceptable –
0.84≥1.5x0.16

0.21

0.63

0.16

limited

0.20

0.00

0.84

1.00

0.33

certainty

0.67

0.22

certainty

0.89

1.00

0.10

as

0.60

0.10

as

0.80

1.00

Unacceptable - Certain

0.63

0.78

0.50

Acceptable –
0.63≥1.5x0.37
0.16

0.22

0.67

0.16

0.22

0.00

limited

0.10

0.70

Acceptable –
0.68≥1.5x0.16

0.37

0.84

0.32

limited

0.10

0.00

0.84

1.00

0.22

0.50

certainty

0.78

0.90

0.33

0.30

certainty

0.78

1.00

as

as

0.90

1.00

Unacceptable - Certain

Table 9: Risk tolerance.
Risk acceptance with limited certainty was also higher for the entire study population and sub
populations where life involvement was present. Participants would typically put both their
own safety and the safety of personnel under their command at increased risk to facilitate
occupant rescue (from all risk sources). This risk acceptance with limited certainty increased
marginally where rescue was of a colleague, particularly when risk was transferred from the
participant to those under the participant’s control. Marginal increase in risk threshold was
observed between personal and personnel exposure where rescue involved a child as opposed
to an adult. Whilst it is hypothesised this increase may be a result of perceived community
expectations (as detailed in Table 8), further investigation is required to confirm this
proposition.
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Risk acceptance with limited certainty declined quickly for the protection of property, whilst
the level of certainty decreased as the lead time to the realisation of potential consequences
increased. For example, the certainty regarding risk acceptance involving acute impacts such
as trauma was generally higher compared to those involving cancer or lung disease. This
suggest participants were more likely to be concerned with impacts they can witness
immediately and is supported by the findings of Penney (2013).

Descriptive analysis of the results illustrated in Table 9 provide a mean probability of 0.529
(standard deviation of 0.336) that the entire survey group will agree on the acceptability of any
given situation where the risk is personal in nature. By comparison a mean probability of 0.449
(standard deviation of 0.321) that the entire survey group will agree on the acceptability of any
given situation where the risk is to personnel under the participant’s command. This further
supports the findings that participants were more likely to accept risk when they believed the
consequences were limited to themselves.

Analysis of the results of phase one can be summarised as:
1. Participants demonstrated limited tendency towards a higher risk threshold than those
described in the DGLC (2008, 2013) philosophies when occupant or rescuer life
involvement was under threat;
2. Participants overwhelming demonstrated a detailed understanding of hazard mitigation
at dynamic emergency incidents through the appropriate use of controls and a
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culturalised understanding of risk. However, this understanding did not extend to the
definition of risk or risk management process defined in AS31000;
3. Whilst all participants recognised the requirement to continually reassess controls
applied to hazards during dynamic emergency incidents, participants did not
collectively demonstrate an understanding that the risk management process is a single
process that must be repeated at regular intervals as required by the nature of the
incident;
4. The majority of participants expressed a belief they were subject to external
expectations that emergency personnel would risk their lives to protect other people
and had a moral obligation to do so;
5. A lesser majority of participants expressed a belief they were subject to external
expectations that emergency personnel would risk their lives to protect property;
6. Significant variance was observed between organisational and participant attitudes
regarding consequence severity;
7. In the absence of documented organisational risk thresholds for dynamic emergency
incidents, there was limited certainty amongst participants in regards to determining
risk acceptance. Further, the level of agreement varied depending on whether the risk
was personal in nature or applicable to the personnel under the participant’s command;
8. Risk acceptance was the highest during life involvement situations and marginally
higher again where the life under threat was either a child or a colleague. Risk
acceptance declined quickly where life involvement did not occur; and
9. The level of certainty regarding risk acceptance decreased as the lead time to the
realisation of potential consequences increased. For example the certainty regarding
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risk acceptance involving acute impacts such as trauma was generally higher compared
to those involving cancer or lung disease.

4.2

Phase Two

The objective of phase two of the study was to analyse available data to provide enhanced
understanding of risk sources during dynamic emergency incidents. This analysis would
facilitate enhanced awareness of the internal context of emergency operations by incident
controllers as part of the risk management process.

Initial analysis enabled the calculation of conditional probability given a reportable incident
occurs (B) and likelihood on the basis of activity, risk source and nature of injury reported.
The results are detailed in Tables 10-12. Each table is ordered on the basis of frequency.

Activity (A)

Count

P(A|B)

Occurrence
Likelihood
per year

Firefighting

327

0.491

21.800

Almost certain

RCR

110

0.165

7.333

Almost certain

Bushfire fighting

99

0.149

6.600

Almost certain

Rescue

36

0.054

2.400

Almost certain

Driving

30

0.045

2.000

Almost certain

Breathing Apparatus

20

0.030

1.333

Almost certain
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Suicide Response

15

0.023

1.000

Almost certain

Hazmat

12

0.018

0.800

Moderate

Environmental

8

0.012

0.533

Moderate

DBA

5

0.008

0.333

Moderate

Not reported

2

0.003

0.133

Unlikely

Storm

2

0.003

0.133

Unlikely

Table 10: Analysis by activity.
Risk source (A)

Count

P(A|B)

Occurrence
Likelihood
per year

Physical Strain

215

0.323

14.333

Almost certain

Exposure - asbestos

120

0.180

8.000

Almost certain

Exposure - psychological

95

0.143

6.333

Almost certain

Impact

49

0.074

3.267

Almost certain

Exposure - smoke

37

0.056

2.467

Almost certain

Exposure - biohazard

24

0.036

1.600

Almost certain

Exposure - hazmat fire

24

0.036

1.600

Almost certain

Equipment failure

21

0.032

1.400

Almost certain

Exposure - chemical

20

0.030

1.333

Almost certain

Thermal

16

0.024

1.067

Likely

Operator error

11

0.017

0.733

Moderate

Animal

7

0.011

0.467

Moderate

Communications

5

0.008

0.333

Moderate

Environmental

4

0.006

0.267

Moderate

Impaired Vision

4

0.006

0.267

Moderate

Other person

4

0.006

0.267

Moderate
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Blast/Explosion

2

0.003

0.133

Unlikely

Entrapment

2

0.003

0.133

Unlikely

Exposure - noise

2

0.003

0.133

Unlikely

Violence

2

0.003

0.133

Unlikely

Electrical

1

0.002

0.067

Rare

Not reported

1

0.002

0.067

Rare

Table 11: Analysis by risk source.

Nature of injury (A)

Count

P(A|B)

Occurrence
Likelihood
per year

Inhalation

163

0.245

10.867

Almost certain

Psychological

96

0.144

6.400

Almost certain

Nil

70

0.105

4.667

Almost certain

Back

56

0.084

3.733

Almost certain

Knee

42

0.063

2.800

Almost certain

Eye

32

0.048

2.133

Almost certain

Heat illness

30

0.045

2.000

Almost certain

Shoulder

26

0.039

1.733

Almost certain

Leg

16

0.024

1.067

Almost certain

General

15

0.023

1.000

Likely

Head / spinal

13

0.020

0.867

Likely

Ankle

11

0.017

0.733

Moderate

Arm

11

0.017

0.733

Moderate

Finger

9

0.014

0.600

Moderate

Face

8

0.012

0.533

Moderate

Foot

8

0.012

0.533

Moderate
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Multiple

8

0.012

0.533

Moderate

Neck

8

0.012

0.533

Moderate

Hand

7

0.011

0.467

Moderate

Elbow

6

0.009

0.400

Moderate

Ear

5

0.008

0.333

Moderate

Absorption

4

0.006

0.267

Moderate

Not reported

4

0.006

0.267

Moderate

Wrist

4

0.006

0.267

Moderate

Chest

3

0.005

0.200

Unlikely

Groin

3

0.005

0.200

Unlikely

Hip

3

0.005

0.200

Unlikely

Abdominal

2

0.003

0.133

Unlikely

Ingestion

2

0.003

0.133

Rare

Thermal

1

0.002

0.067

Rare

Table 12: Analysis by injury.
By frequency, firefighting was almost three times more likely to result in a reportable event
compared to any other activity with an occurrence of 21.8 times per year. Road crash rescue
(RCR) response resulted in 7.3 reportable events per year whilst bushfire fighting resulted in
6.6 reportable incidents per year. This result suggest additional attention should be provided
in training personnel and developing suitable risk mitigation procedures the activities most
likely to give rise to a reportable incident.

In terms of risk source, Physical Strain is almost 1.8 times more likely to result in a reportable
event compared to other risk sources. This is consistent with the physically demanding nature
of firefighting reported by DFES (2013b) and is comparable to overexertion/strain injury rates
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in United States firefighters reported by FEMA (2011). The high rate of reportable events
resulting from Physical Strain is significant as physical strain may be in part preventable
through the implementation of a suitable physical fitness program. Winter et al. (2010, p235)
conclude however that any such program “must be positive and not punitive in design; require
mandatory participation by all uniformed personnel; allow for age, gender, and position in the
department; allow for on-duty-time participation utilizing facilities provided by the
department; provide for rehabilitation and remedial support for those in need; and contain
training and education components.”

Exposure to various hazards including asbestos, chemicals and biohazards collectively
accounts for more reports than any other risk source (total of 225 incidents with a conditional
probability of 0.338). Such exposures are impossible to eradicate due to the inherent nature of
all hazards emergency response. However the likelihood of adverse outcomes can be in part
mitigated through procedural and tactical measures. Such an approach is best illustrated using
a bow tie analysis (Robinson et al, 2010) as shown in Figure 5. In this manner both preexposure and post exposure controls or barriers can be implemented holistically to reduce the
likelihood and severity of adverse consequences. The bow tie analysis also facilitates the
illustration of relationships between various barriers. Figure 5 provides a simple example of
this in the firefighting context. Where a relationship exists between barriers, the influence of
the preceding barrier may be either agonistic or antagonistic on the effectiveness of the
following barrier. For example, inappropriate or insufficient research and data may lead to
inappropriate organisational policy. This in turn can result in inappropriate training which will
ultimately weaken risk management at all operational and organisational levels. The combined
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effect of the barriers and intrinsic relationships can ultimately affect the severity of realised
consequences.
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Figure 5: Simplified bow tie contextualised to firefighting operations
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Just as firefighting is extremely physically demanding, it is also psychologically demanding
with exposure to psychological trauma identified as the second most common risk source
resulting in reportable events. Carll (2007) and Trappler (2014) concur that care must be taken
in addressing exposures of a psychological nature in firefighting which are unique to the
emergency service profession. Just as education, awareness and resilience training is important
prior to exposure, specific psychological management programs and counselling are required
post exposure.

Analysis by injury yields results that in limited circumstances appear to conflict with other
available data sets. Inhalation ‘injuries’ are the most probable of all classified injuries to occur.
However, this may be explained by the fact that all incidences of “inhalation” of smoke or other
chemicals that were reported are captured in this category, regardless of whether acute injury
occurred. Psychological ‘injuries’ were the second most common reported injuries and this is
consistent with the analysis of risk source data. Surprisingly thermal injuries, being those
resulting from heat transfer were the least probable (0.002 conditional probability). This
conflicts with data reported by FEMA (2011, 2012) which identifies a significantly higher
thermal injury occurrence rate. The calculated figure may be lower than the actual number of
injuries as a result of thermal impacts as it is suggested that many incidents may remain
unreported (DFES Health and Safety Services, 2015). The probability of “Nil” injuries
occurring represents “Near Misses” where no injury was actually sustained and is the third
highest amongst reported injuries sustained. Again this figure may be lower than the actual
number of near misses that occur during incidents due to the lack of report completion when
near misses occur.
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Tables 13 to 24 report the conditional probability of a specific injury occurring given an injury
occurs during the specified activity. Across all activities, the “Nil” injury or ‘near miss’ is
prevalent. This is consistent with previous findings and suggests a large number of incidents
occur with the potential to cause injury but do not actually cause injury in the specific case
reported. Psychological injuries are also well represented throughout the reports, particularly
where the potential or realisation of human trauma is present (for instance Road Crash Rescue
and Suicide Response). In the case of reported injuries during Suicide Response it is suggested
it is likely the “Not Reported” values should actually also be psychological injuries but have
not been documented as such in the relevant reports.

Injury

Conditional
Probability

Nil

0.300

Back

0.150

Knee

0.150

Head / spinal

0.100

Heat illness

0.100

Neck

0.100

Ankle

0.050

Shoulder
0.050
Table 13: Conditional probability of specific injury during Breathing Apparatus operations.
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Injury

Conditional
Probability

Eye

0.253

Knee

0.141

Nil

0.131

Back

0.081

Inhalation

0.061

Leg

0.061

Ankle

0.051

Shoulder

0.051

Foot

0.030

Heat illness

0.030

Finger

0.020

Neck

0.020

Arm

0.010

Chest

0.010

Elbow

0.010

Face

0.010

Multiple

0.010

Psychological

0.010

Wrist

0.010

Table 14: Conditional probability of specific injury during Bushfire operations.
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Injury

Conditional
Probability

Eye

0.800

Knee
0.200
Table 15: Conditional probability of specific injury during Direct Brigade Alarm response.

Injury

Conditional
Probability

Nil

0.800

Back

0.033

Ear

0.033

Leg

0.033

Psychological

0.033

Shoulder

0.033

Wrist

0.033

Table 16: Conditional probability of specific injury during Driving operations.

Injury

Conditional
Probability

Finger

0.375

Nil

0.250

Arm

0.125

Elbow

0.125

Heat illness

0.125

Table 17: Conditional probability of specific injury resulting from Environment related
incidents.
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Injury

Conditional
Probability

Inhalation

0.434

Back

0.092

Heat illness

0.067

Knee

0.064

Nil

0.064

Shoulder

0.046

Head / spinal

0.034

Leg

0.028

Arm

0.024

Multiple

0.018

Foot

0.015

Hand

0.015

Ear

0.012

Psychological

0.012

Ankle

0.009

Elbow

0.009

Eye

0.009

Finger

0.009

Neck

0.009

Abdominal

0.006

Chest

0.006

Hip

0.006

Face

0.003
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Groin

0.003

Thermal

0.003

Table 18: Conditional probability of specific injury during Firefighting operations.

Injury

Conditional
Probability

General

0.500

Inhalation

0.417

Heat illness

0.083

Table 19: Conditional probability of specific injury during Hazardous Materials operations.

Injury

Conditional
Probability

Knee

0.500

Psychological
0.500
Table 20: Conditional probability of specific injury during operations not specified (Not
Reported).

Injury

Conditional
Probability

Psychological

0.600

Back

0.100

General

0.082

Face

0.045
pg. 78

Absorption

0.018

Inhalation

0.018

Shoulder

0.018

Ankle

0.009

Arm

0.009

Finger

0.009

Groin

0.009

Hand

0.009

Heat illness

0.009

Hip

0.009

Ingestion

0.009

Knee

0.009

Multiple

0.009

Neck

0.009

Nil

0.009

Wrist

0.009

Table 21: Conditional probability of specific injury during Road Crash Rescue operations.

Injury

Conditional
Probability

Psychological

0.306

Inhalation

0.194

Back

0.083

Nil

0.083
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Absorption

0.056

Shoulder

0.056

Ankle

0.028

Elbow

0.028

Groin

0.028

Hand

0.028

Ingestion

0.028

Knee

0.028

Not reported

0.028

Wrist

0.028

Table 22: Conditional probability of specific injury during Rescue (other than RCR)
operations.

Injury

Conditional
Probability

Face

0.500

Inhalation

0.500

Table 23: Conditional probability of specific injury during Storm operations.

Injury

Conditional
Probability

Psychological

0.800

Not reported

0.200

Table 24: Conditional probability of specific injury during Suicide Response operations.
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Analysis reveals thermal injuries account for a relatively insignificant conditional probability
of only 0.003 during Firefighting activities only. No thermal burns are reported during
Bushfire or other response. This is in stark contradiction to the probability of thermal injuries
in United States statistics (FEMA, 2012). However, it is hypothesised that this may be in part
due to under reporting of thermal injuries, due to thermal injuries being referred to as injuries
to specific body parts without reference to the burn trauma or differences in firefighting tactics
between Australia and the United States which may result in different mechanisms and
frequencies of injury.

For example, inhalation injuries appear over-represented in the data which is considered
surprising given the significant respiratory protection available to responding crews (DFES
2012a, 2012b, 2015a,).

Analysis of the report descriptions suggests that a significant

proportion of inhalation exposures are due to incorrect fitting respiratory protection that do not
provide adequate seals. This has recently been in part rectified through the implementation of
full face respirators (DFES, 2015e). The conditional probability of heat illness occurrence also
warrants attention with prevalence amongst all operations and responses that require the
responder to wear structural firefighting Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and require
significant physical effort.

Review of the conditional probabilities detailed above can assist incident controllers having
enhanced evidence based awareness of potential consequences and likelihoods prior to their
occurrence during an emergency incident. Analysis of the conditional probability of injury
given an injury occurs during each of the specific operations will also facilitate the review and
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improvement of strategic and tactical planning; personnel relief requirements; the potential
effectiveness of PPE; and even guide the potential development of targeted prophylactic
physical training programs.

Tables 25 to 36 provide perhaps some of the most beneficial data to facilitate the development
of evidence based risk mitigation strategies prior to and on the incident ground. Physical Strain
recurrently accounts for high, if not the highest, level of Risk Source giving rise to a reportable
incident across nearly all activities. This finding is consistent with the previous results of both
this study and FEMA (2011) and reaffirms the notion that firefighting is extremely physical in
nature (DFES, 2013b; Penney, 2013). It is suggested that a lack of physical wellness may be
the primary contributor to reportable incidents as a result of Physical Strain. For example,
Moore-Merrell et al. (2008) observed that physical strain was the second highest contributing
factor to firefighter injury in the United States (the first being a lack of situational awareness).

Initiating Event

Conditional
Probability

Physical Strain

0.550

Impact

0.150

Entrapment

0.100

Equipment
failure

0.100

Communications 0.050
Electrical

0.050

Table 25: Conditional probability of specific initiating events (Risk Sources) during
Breathing Apparatus operations.
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Initiating Event

Conditional
Probability

Physical Strain

0.515

Exposure smoke

0.253

Exposure chemical

0.061

Impact

0.051

Thermal

0.051

Exposure asbestos

0.030

Equipment
failure

0.020

Exposure psychological

0.010

Violence

0.010

Table 26: Conditional probability of specific initiating events (Risk Sources) during Bushfire
fighting operations.

Initiating Event

Conditional
Probability

Impact

0.600

Exposure 0.400
chemical
Table 27: Conditional probability of specific initiating events (Risk Sources) during Direct
Brigade Alarm response.
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Initiating Event

Conditional
Probability

Operator error

0.300

Equipment
failure

0.267

Environmental

0.133

Impaired Vision

0.133

Other person

0.133

Exposure 0.033
psychological
Table 28: Conditional probability of specific initiating events (Risk Sources) during Driving
operations.

Initiating Event

Conditional
Probability

Animal

0.875

Physical Strain
0.125
Table 29: Conditional probability of specific initiating events (Risk Sources) during
Environment related incidents.

Initiating Event

Conditional
Probability

Physical Strain

0.358

Exposure asbestos

0.315

Impact

0.104
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Exposure hazmat fire

0.073

Exposure smoke

0.037

Thermal

0.034

Equipment
failure

0.024

Communications 0.012
Exposure chemical

0.009

Exposure psychological

0.009

Blast/Explosion

0.006

Exposure - noise

0.006

Operator error

0.006

Not reported

0.003

Violence

0.003

Table 30: Conditional probability of specific initiating events (Risk Sources) during
Firefighting operations.

Initiating Event

Conditional
Probability

Exposure chemical

0.583

Exposure asbestos

0.333

Physical Strain

0.083

Table 31: Conditional probability of specific initiating events (Risk Sources) during
Hazardous Materials operations.
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Initiating Event

Conditional
Probability

Exposure psychological

0.500

Physical Strain

0.500

Table 32: Conditional probability of specific initiating events (Risk Sources) during
operations Not Recorded.

Initiating Event

Conditional
Probability

Exposure psychological

0.600

Physical Strain

0.209

Exposure biohazard

0.164

Exposure asbestos

0.018

Impact
0.009
Table 33: Conditional probability of specific initiating events (Risk Sources) during Road
Crash Rescue operations.

Initiating Event

Conditional
Probability

Exposure psychological

0.306

Physical Strain

0.278

Exposure asbestos

0.194
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Exposure biohazard

0.111

Impact

0.056

Equipment
failure

0.028

Exposure chemical

0.028

Table 34: Conditional probability of specific initiating events (Risk Sources) during Rescue
(other than RCR) operations.

Initiating Event

Conditional
Probability

Exposure asbestos

0.500

Impact

0.500

Table 35: Conditional probability of specific initiating events (Risk Sources) during Storm
response.

Initiating Event

Conditional
Probability

Exposure psychological

0.800

Exposure biohazard

0.133

Exposure chemical

0.067

Table 36: Conditional probability of specific initiating events (Risk Sources) during Suicide
Response operations.
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Psychological Exposure was also well represented in the data, particularly amongst incident
response involving human life and trauma including Road Crash Rescue and Suicide Response.
This again supports previous findings of the study.

Exposure to various contaminants was also again prevalent throughout the majority of fields.
This may be significant as the potential effects may be mitigated through appropriate strategic
and tactical response; appropriate PPE and suitable decontamination procedures (DFES, 2015a,
2015b).

Breathing Apparatus operations are amongst the most hazardous of all firefighting activities,
involving the use of self-contained breathing apparatus in atmospheres not conducive to life
due to the presence of smoke, heat, oxygen deficiency and/or excessive temperature (DFES,
2015b). During Breathing Apparatus operations teams of two firefighters will work in close
proximity or inside burning structures and typically rely on a single line of firefighting hose
for fire protection. The margin for error is therefore understandably narrow and the potential
severity of consequences comparatively high (as reported in Table 37). Operations are
extremely physical in nature and this is represented by a conditional probability of 0.55 that
the responsible risk source for the reportable event will be Physical Strain. Analysis also
revealed a conditional probability of Impacts being the responsible risk source for the
reportable incident of 0.15. It is suggested Impacts (as opposed to Explosion / Blasts) are more
likely to occur within the burning structure and subsequently this figure may be reduced
through the defining of organisational risk acceptance thresholds. In turn, this would facilitate
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a reduction in the potential for incident controllers committing crews to internal firefighting in
the absence of life involvement because of a perceived internal or external obligation to do so.

Consequence Severity

Actual

Potential

Insignificant

0.300

0.000

Minor

0.700

0.150

Moderate

0.000

0.400

Major

0.000

0.250

Catastrophic

0.000

0.200

Table 37: Conditional probability of actual and potential consequence severity during
Breathing Apparatus operations.
Tables 37 to 48 provide comparison between actual reported consequence severity and
potential consequence severity for each Activity. Analysis reveals the conditional probability
of moderate to catastrophic potential consequence severity is higher than actual reported
consequence severity across all Activity groups. This may be in part explained by the lack of
subsequent reports or follow up detail for consequences that may have a long period of latency
(for instance psychological exposures, exposures to contaminants) or for injuries that are
initially reported but worsen over time. The results of this analysis also support previous
findings of the prevalence of “Nil” reported injuries in that there is a high conditional
probability of ‘near misses’ in the incidents reported.

Consequence Severity

Actual

Potential

Insignificant

0.818

0.000
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Minor

0.131

0.505

Moderate

0.040

0.101

Major

0.010

0.212

Catastrophic

0.000

0.182

Table 38: Conditional probability of actual and potential consequence severity during
Bushfire Fighting operations.
.
Consequence Severity

Actual

Potential

Insignificant

1.000

0.000

Minor

0.000

0.600

Moderate

0.000

0.000

Major

0.000

0.400

Catastrophic

0.000

0.000

Table 39: Conditional probability of actual and potential consequence severity during Direct
Brigade Alarm response

Consequence Severity

Actual

Potential

Insignificant

0.967

0.133

Minor

0.033

0.100

Moderate

0.000

0.100

Major

0.000

0.167

Catastrophic
0.000
0.500
Table 40: Conditional probability of actual and potential consequence severity during
Driving operations.
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Consequence Severity

Actual

Potential

Insignificant

0.750

0.125

Minor

0.250

0.125

Moderate

0.000

0.750

Major

0.000

0.000

Catastrophic

0.000

0.000

Table 41: Conditional probability of actual and potential consequence severity during
Environmental related incidents.

Consequence Severity

Actual

Potential

Insignificant

0.933

0.031

Minor

0.034

0.147

Moderate

0.021

0.199

Major

0.012

0.098

Catastrophic

0.000

0.526

Table 42: Conditional probability of actual and potential consequence severity during
Firefighting response.

Consequence Severity

Actual

Potential

Insignificant

1.000

0.000

Minor

0.000

0.000

Moderate

0.000

0.000
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Major

0.000

0.083

Catastrophic

0.000

0.917

Table 43: Conditional probability of actual and potential consequence severity during
Hazardous Materials response.

Consequence Severity

Actual

Potential

Insignificant

1.000

0.000

Minor

0.000

0.000

Moderate

0.000

1.000

Major

0.000

0.000

Catastrophic

0.000

0.000

Table 44: Conditional probability of actual and potential consequence severity during
operations Not Recorded.

Consequence Severity

Actual

Potential

Insignificant

0.973

0.000

Minor

0.018

0.073

Moderate

0.009

0.218

Major

0.000

0.027

Catastrophic

0.000

0.682

Table 45: Conditional probability of actual and potential consequence severity during Road
Crash Rescue Operations.
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Consequence Severity

Actual

Potential

Insignificant

0.972

0.000

Minor

0.000

0.111

Moderate

0.028

0.306

Major

0.000

0.056

Catastrophic

0.000

0.528

Table 46: Conditional probability of actual and potential consequence severity during Rescue
operations (other than Road Crash Rescue).

Consequence Severity

Actual

Potential

Insignificant

1.000

0.000

Minor

0.000

0.000

Moderate

0.000

0.000

Major

0.000

0.500

Catastrophic

0.000

0.500

Table 47: Conditional probability of actual and potential consequence severity during Storm
related response.

Consequence Severity

Actual

Potential

Insignificant

1.000

0.000

Minor

0.000

0.133

Moderate

0.000

0.000
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Major

0.000

0.000

Catastrophic

0.000

0.867

Table 48: Conditional probability of actual and potential consequence severity during
Suicide Response operations.

Further analysis reveals that, based on actual consequence severity, there is a conditional
probability of zero (0.000) for a catastrophic severity consequence occurring across the entire
Activity range. This result is not supported by numerous international studies (FEMA, 2011,
2012; Moore-Merrell et al., 2008) and is suggested to have occurred as a result of inadequate
reporting of significant injuries. By comparison, a mean potential catastrophic severity
consequence conditional probability across all Activities of 0.408 (Standard deviation of 0.328)
was calculated. These results represent a significant potential for increased severe injury,
permanent disability and even death amongst the study group and must be considered in the
establishment of the internal context for risk management during dynamic emergency
operations.

Analysis of the results of phase two can be summarised as:
1. Results must be interpreted with some caution. It is suggested current recording
processes do not provide sufficient data to accurately determine the realisation of injury
or illness with extended latency (psychological trauma for instance). Current recording
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processes also do not provide for accumulation injuries as a result of repetitious
exposure, with injuries being assigned to a single event;
2. It is almost certain that a reportable event will occur during the majority of types of
incident response. This is consistent with the notion that firefighting is an inherently
dangerous occupation;
3. Physical strain is the highest cause of reportable event all Activities considered. This
is consistent with international data (FEMA, 2011; Merrill-Moore et al., 2008);
4. Different Activities are associated with differing injury probabilities. Whilst this study
provides limited analysis of the results further study in this area may facilitate the
development of targeted mitigation strategies during preparation for, and response to,
specific emergency incidents in order reduce the occurrence of certain adverse
outcomes;
5. Exposure to various contaminants is prevalent across all Activity groups. This is
consistent with the nature of firefighters responding to a large range of firefighting,
rescue and hazardous materials incidents. As the specific nature of contamination and
/ or product identification often remains undocumented few beneficial conclusions can
be drawn from the study data in this area. An opportunity for future study in this area
exists once suitable data is collected;
6. The potential consequence is consistently greater than the actual consequence realised
in the data analysed. This may be explained by the mitigating effects of post event
barriers (PPE, physical conditioning of personnel etc) or simply the personnel involved
escaped more serious injury due to a combination of events that lead to them being
close to as opposed to being in the direct line of impact; and
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7. During almost all types of operational response the potential for major or catastrophic
adverse outcomes is present.

4.3

Summary

There are a number of limitations that may affect the validity of the findings of this study.
Foremost is the relatively small number of priors available for analysis and the lack of sufficient
detail with which to complete comprehensive analysis. Whilst all care and due diligence has
been undertaken to the extent practicable to provide unbiased and accurate analysis, enhanced
data sets would facilitate greater certainty of the findings reached.

Another limitation is the reliance of United States statistics on which to make comparison to
the injury data obtained as firefighting tactics may vary between Australian and American
services. Australian tactics, particularly in the structural fire setting may be more closely
aligned with United Kingdom fire services, however available data for comparison was not
found as records did not identify type of injury or activity at time of injury (DCLG, 2012).

These limitations, in addition to those discussed in section 3.3.3 of this report are not fatal, but
rather should be acknowledged when the presented conclusions are considered.
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This research has the potential to significantly improve the process of risk management in
dynamic emergency situations the Western Australian Department of Fire and Emergency
Services and other emergency services throughout the world. It achieves this by not only
identifying inconsistencies and shortfalls of current practice, but also by identifying the
necessary steps required in order to align risk management during emergency situations with
AS31000.

Perhaps most importantly, this research explicitly rejects any notion of the validity of “dynamic
risk management” being a stand-alone process for managing risk during emergency situations.
For best practice to be realised the architectural structure or process of risk management cannot
change. The context in which risk management is completed may vary in dynamic emergency
situations compared to that of corporate boardrooms, however it is this unique and dynamic
context of emergency situations that only further requires the AS31000 risk management
process to be completed in its entirety each and every time risk is assessed and subsequently
managed. In order to achieve this, emergency services must first succinctly define their
organisational risk attitudes during emergency situations (which will inevitably vary from risk
attitudes during normal business) and educate their personnel appropriately so that it forms part
of the subconscious and conscious incident risk management process.

This education must occur at the earliest stage of a firefighter’s career to ensure appropriate
and consistent risk contexts, tolerance and management are indoctrinated into all facets of
emergency response.

It is only through such education that AS31000 compliant risk

management will be able to be completed in the dynamic emergency environment, not only by
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incident controllers, but by all personnel on at the incident. This will foreseeably result in safer
work practices, better decisions and reduced adverse outcomes for both individuals and
organisations.

This study has also highlighted a number of opportunities for further study in the field.

Repetition of this study incorporating the entire population of incident controllers within DFES
would allow greater analysis of current risk attitudes and may serve to enhance the definition
of the internal DFES context.

Repetition of this study using those persons or agencies that may be involved in a critical
external review or practices, such as WorkSafe, would significantly enhance the understanding
of the external context and expectations in which DFES operates. This may have the additional
benefit of enabling DFES to align internal and external risk attitudes so that conflicting
attitudes are not found to be a source of adverse outcomes. In this manner, even should an
adverse outcome be realised, organisational risk attitudes would be consistent with external
legislative requirements.

Once these attitudes are adopted and personnel appropriately

educated this would also foreseeably lead to improved practice during dynamic emergency
incidents. It should be noted however that any external parties included in such as study would
need to have a sound understanding of the DFES internal context so that findings are applicable
to the incident ground.
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Comparable studies in other emergency services throughout Australia will facilitate critical
analysis of the validity of the findings of this study throughout the Australian context. It would
also significantly enhance the priors available for analysis of conditional probability which in
turn would enhance the validity of findings.
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5.0 Conclusion

Published literature revealed significant variance in the extent of defined risk thresholds
amongst international fire services with an almost total absence within Australian fire services.
The literature also identified that whilst almost all emergency services acknowledged the
importance of adaptive and responsible incident management during dynamic emergency
operations, with the exception of the United Kingdom Fire Service, application of the AS31000
process was at best partial and in some international cases completely abandoned. Noncompliances were found to be undefined organisational risk attitudes; external contexts
remaining unacknowledged; and only partial application of the processes defined in AS31000.
In particular, the perception that the risk management process itself changed during dynamic
emergency operations as opposed to the process being continually repeated in its entirety with
varying risk thresholds within the context of the environment and the dynamics of each
individual emergency at the point in time the risk assessment is conducted must be addressed.

Results of this research confirmed conclusions within the literature review. Incident controllers
were found to rely on professional craft knowledge evolved through their own subjective
experiences. Whilst historical incident management practices have arguably been effective in
the prevention of severe injury amongst responding personnel (an average conditional
probability of 0.893 of ‘Nil’ injury across all activities being calculated), they have arguably
also been non-compliant with AS31000.

This may have significant implications on the

facilitation of post incident reviews and forensic reports as it is almost certain that the
consensus on risk acceptance by the authors of these reviews and reports will vary from that of
the incident controller at the time of the emergency incident.

Ramifications of any nonpg. 100

compliance would only increase should a catastrophic consequence be realised and a review
be conducted by an external party who cannot reference the internal fire service context and
whom would rely solely on AS31000 as the required standard.

Whilst historically proven to be highly effective without further definition and dissemination
of internal contexts and risk thresholds, risk management during dynamic emergency
operations in the Western Australian fire and emergency service is not considered currently
compliant with AS31000.

This research also highlighted the need for organisations to have defined risk acceptance
criteria for incident controllers to reference in order to reduce the potential for individual bias
or conflicting operational strategies between incident controllers at strategic levels and officers
involved in tactical front line response (where the exposure transfers from personnel under the
incident controller’s command to the personnel themselves).
The answer may lie in several targeted responses:
1. Enhanced reporting to facilitate information rich data with which to better define
specific emergency services risk;
2. Implementation of probability based risk modelling to assist evidence based risk
management at all levels of emergency incidents;
3. Defining and communicating DFES operational risk thresholds; and
4. Adoption of the philosophies and processes of DCLG (2008, 2012) contextualised to
the internal and external contexts of DFES.
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By providing consistent risk threshold guidance throughout a firefighter’s and officer’s career
the potential for adverse outcomes will foreseeably reduce. Further research, improved data
collection and ongoing review at strategic and operational levels is also essential to enhance
dynamic incident risk management in an ongoing and AS31000 compliant basis.
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